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Chapter 4 
Capitalization and Privatization in Bolivia: An Approximation to an Evaluation 
By Gover Barja*, David McKenzie**, and Miguel Urquiola*** 
 
 
Introduction and summary 
 
During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a wave of privatizations, which 
were an integral part of stabilization programs and a general reordering of the role of 
states in the regional economy.  Over the past few years, these privatizations have come 
under increasing fire.  Adverse effects ascribed to them range from an increase in utility 
service prices, to aggravating or even causing the recession currently affecting the region.  
In short, they are sharing in criticism directed at the entire liberalization process. 
 
In this context, accurate knowledge on the real consequences of privatization can 
be of considerable value. But while research has been carried out on some of its 
economic effects, there is less information on privatization’s broader “social” 
consequences.  The goal of this chapter is to try to fill in some of these gaps as they 
concern the case of Bolivia. 
 
We first describe Bolivia’s privatization process, placing emphasis on the 
particularities of the capitalization1 mechanism that was used, and the regulatory 
framework introduced as its essential complement.  We then detail the changes in the 
industrial organization and ownership patterns in the electricity, oil and gas, 
telecommunications, transportation, and water industries.  Our concern is mainly with the 
large privatizations in infrastructure, in part because of their economic size and in part 
because of the availability of data and methods allowing one to estimate the social and 
distributional impact of these transactions.   
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1
 The nature of these two processes, privatization and capitalization, is described in detail below.  In terms 
of the amount of assets transferred, the latter was clearly the more important.  In part because of this, the 
discussion often uses the two terms interchangeably. 
 The discussion then turns to these processes’ economic and social consequences.  
In the first case, the key issues are which agents benefited from the transfer of assets, and 
the effects on firm-level variables like investment, profitability, and transfers to the State.  
With regards to social outcomes, we focus on the effects on employees and consumers.  
For the first, interest centers on what happened to employment and wages in the sectors 
affected; for the second, on what occurred to access, prices, and service quality for 
privatized utilities, and to consumer welfare more generally. 
 
This chapter touches on all these issues, and additionally tries to provide a sense 
of the Bolivian population’s changing assessments of the entire process.  Although in 
several cases data limitations make a full treatment impossible, the available information 
leads to the following broad conclusions (roughly in the order they appear): 
 
1) By design, capitalization and privatization generated significant transfers of assets 
to foreign firms.  The Bolivian population was not excluded from this benefit, 
however, since it collectively received a 45 percent share in most of the transferred 
enterprises.  Dividends from this ownership have been used to pay old-age benefits. 
2) These processes, combined with the introduction of a regulatory framework, seem 
to have delivered on their central stated goal: to substantially increase investment (as 
well as competition, in some cases) in the sectors affected. 
3) These investments have been associated with significant increases in capacity and 
output – from improvements in utility access rates, to a ten-fold rise in proven gas and 
oil reserves within five years of the reforms.  
4) Productivity also increased significantly across all sectors, in part due to 
employment reductions.  We find, however, that these reductions were small relative 
to the economy as a whole.  Unless the indirect effects were very large, therefore, 
privatization simply cannot account for the increasing unemployment observed in 
recent years. 
5) Tax receipts from regulated firms appear to have increased after reform.  In the 
current recession, however, there is pressure for further increases, particularly from 
the oil and gas sector. 
6) While most capitalized firms do report positive profits, their returns on equity 
have declined in recent years, again, particularly during the ongoing recession. 
7) We find that in the urban areas, capitalization is associated with increases in 
households’ access to utility services.  Especially for electricity and water, these 
expansions have not bypassed the poor.  On the contrary, in many cases it is the lower 
income deciles that seem to have benefited the most.  For telephone services, 
improvements have been greater further up the income distribution.  Several of these 
findings persist when we try to isolate only those effects due to privatization itself. 
8) Concerning prices, there are large gaps in the information available.  On balance, 
it seems that price increases have not been large, with the exception of those 
attempted as part of the water concession in Cochabamba. 
9) Taken together, the access improvements seem to dominate the price increases, 
resulting in welfare gains for many households.  Not surprisingly, these gains are 
largest for those services and income groups for which access grew most.  In 
particular, in electricity there are significant gains for the lower deciles in the income 
distribution.  For phone services, improvements are observed almost across the board. 
For water, we find that the La Paz/Alto concession seems to have produced welfare 
gains as well.  Not surprisingly, in the case of the failed concession in Cochabamba, 
we find that welfare effects would—had the concession continued—been rather 
negative unless substantial improvements in access would have accompanied the 
proposed tariff increases. 
10) The regulatory framework seems to have strengthened the rule of law and 
promoted competition and transparency in some sectors.  Nevertheless, it is clearly 
still necessary to improve the regulatory and broader institutional framework. 
11) As elsewhere, privatization/capitalization and the introduction of regulation were 
part and parcel of a broader restructuring of the economy.  In Bolivia, privatization 
lagged behind stabilization significantly, but it was still crucial in the shift in the 
state’s focus from productive to social sector activities.  Nevertheless, after about 
seven to eight years of reform and four of recession, private investment has slowed 
down and a consensus seems to be reemerging for greater state involvement in the 
economy. 
 
These findings provide a brief and admittedly incomplete evaluation of 
privatization in Bolivia.  We emphasize, further, that it was the combination of 
privatization/capitalization, on the one hand, and regulation, on the other, that was 
substituted for state ownership, although for conciseness we will often refer to the 
collection of these as “privatization.”  Further, we note it is impossible to fully 
disentangle the effects of these processes from those of associated events, like the 
introduction of new technologies. 
 
That said, our findings suggest that on the whole these reforms met with relative 
success.  The fact remains, however, that they are not popular, at least to judge by polls 
and politicians’ pronouncements.  In the final part of the paper, we provide some 
hypotheses to explain this, as well as some detail on the political economy of the reforms. 
 
An aspect we highlight is the popular suspicion that, even if output and 
productivity have improved, the capitalized enterprises are being run with only the best 
interests of the majority (foreign) owners in mind, and that the regulatory system has 
been unable to adequately restrain this natural tendency.  The recent worldwide focus on 
corporate malfeasance has helped bring these concerns to the forefront. 
 
This standard issue has gained salience in Bolivia because, as stated, the 
population collectively owns a 45 percent share in capitalized firms, and the dividends 
accruing to this ownership are used to finance old-age benefits.  Because these dividends 
have been declining (partially due to a recession), the amounts collected have been 
insufficient to adequately fund benefits in the amount promised initially.    
 
Another issue we emphasize is our impression that the government that 
implemented these reforms “oversold” them, promising more, on the job creation front 
for instance, than they could reasonably deliver.  Finally, the reform’s entire reputation 
has been hurt by a couple of high profile failures, one regarding the national airline and 
another a water concession in the city of Cochabamba. 
 
None of these issues might have been salient in a healthy economic environment, 
but in the economic slowdown Bolivia has been experiencing since 1999, they have 
significantly contributed to privatization’s bad reputation.  Further, the persistence of the 
economic slowdown is to an important degree due to fiscal rigidities introduced by other 
reforms, such as decentralization and pension reform.  For example, the fiscal deficit 
created by the transition away from the old “pay as you go” pension system reached five 
percent of GDP by 2002, and is not expected to decrease for at least a decade. This 
generates pressures for economy wide tax increases and thus contributes to further 
questions regarding structural reform as a whole. 
 
Capitalization/privatization:  The process and its direct effects 
 
Bolivia initiated significant economic liberalizations in 1985, primarily in an 
effort to tame hyperinflation and emerge from a deep recession.  Despite success with 
these early market-friendly initiatives, the country did not engage in significant and 
sustained privatization until about ten years later.  When it finally embarked on this 
process, the government employed traditional privatization in some instances, but mainly 
relied on capitalization as a mechanism for the transfer of state-owned firms.   
 
This section first describes how these approaches differ, and how the introduction 
of regulatory mechanisms served as a key complement to both.  For each of the affected 
sectors, the discussion also covers changes in industrial organization and regulatory 
arrangements, as well as ownership patterns 
 
Capitalization and privatization:  general overview 
 
Under traditional privatization, the government transfers a majority of ownership 
in a state firm to the private sector, receives the sale proceeds, and has freedom over how 
to spend them.  Under Bolivian capitalization, the state transferred shares (mainly in 
infrastructure firms) equivalent to 50 percent of the firm to the investor with the winning 
bid.  It also yielded between 45 and 50 percent to private pension fund administrators 
who represent the general citizenry, and who use the funds derived from this share to pay 
old-age benefits complementary to those stemming from individual retirement accounts.2  
The remainder (about 4 percent, on average) accrued to the company’s employees. 
 
By its payment, the investor gains the right to manage the firm, and commits to 
investing its capital contribution, the total amount it offered for its 50 percent share, in the 
firm’s development.  It must carry this out within a specified period (typically six to eight 
years), agree to fulfill obligations that encompass expansion and quality goals, and 
operate under regulation and a long-term (typically 40 year) contract.3 
 
Under this scheme, therefore, investment is given a high priority, and the 
government gains no disposable income.  This reflects the fact that having come 
relatively late in Bolivia’s liberalization, capitalization was not seen as a means to cover 
deficits, but rather as a way to attract foreign investment and improve management in key 
areas of the economy.   
 
Taken together, capitalization and privatization raised significant amounts of 
capital:  total commitments add up to about two billion dollars, roughly equivalent to 30 
percent of GDP.  Capitalization accounted for most of these proceeds, however, 1.7 
billion dollars, as opposed to 0.3 billion from traditional privatization.4   
 
                                                 
2
 As this suggests, a reform to the pensions system accompanied capitalization in Bolivia.  We discuss this 
in detail below.   
3
 The investor made a bank deposit with this payment, and was instructed to keep records on its use.  
Government audits of investment, firm management and performance took a long time to be initiated, and 
are currently under way. 
4
 While privatization started in 1992 with about 50 percent of its proceeds concentrated in 1999, 
capitalization occurred in the 1994-1997 period.   
Regulation as a complementary reform  
 
Capitalization was complemented with reforms to each sector’s industrial 
organization, and with a regulatory framework that has the stated goal of promoting 
competition and efficiency.5  The key legislation was the SIRESE (Sistema de 
Regulación Sectorial) Law (1994), which created a regulatory system for the 
infrastructure sector.  In essence, it defines the institutional structure, including the role of 
five regulatory agencies (Superintendencias) for the electricity, telecommunications, 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas), potable water, and transportation industries.  Additionally, it 
sets up an overseeing agency responsible for system-wide coordination, second instance 
appeals and evaluation; and introduces market competition as one of the guiding 
principles in the infrastructure sector. 
 
Four more specific laws round out the legal framework:  Electricity (1994), 
Telecommunications (1995), Hydrocarbons (1996) and Potable Water (2000).  These 
introduced changes in each sector’s industrial organization, and govern aspects related to 
tariff regulation, entry, service quality, and sanctions.  The sector-specific regulatory 
agencies created as part of SIRESE administer each law. 
 
Changes in industrial organization and regulatory arrangements 
 
We briefly describe the more important changes implemented in each sector. 
 
Electricity 
 
Prior to reform, the electricity industry was divided into the National 
Interconnected System (NIS) and other independent networks, a distinction which 
remains today.6  The NIS covers the largest cities, while the other networks serve other 
                                                 
5
 For more on regulation and regulatory institutions in Bolivia, see Barja (2000) and SIRESE (2000). 
6
 The NIS accounts for close to 90 percent of electricity consumption. 
urban and some rural areas.7  This paper focuses on the NIS, where the state-owned 
ENDE8 was active in generation and transmission.  Additionally, it had some distribution 
activities, mainly through ELFEC9 in the city of Cochabamba.  COBEE10, long a private 
company, participated in generation and distribution in the cities of La Paz and Oruro.  
Other distribution firms or cooperatives were, CRE11 in Santa Cruz, SEPSA12 in Potosí 
and CESSA13 in Sucre.  Competition existed only between ENDE and COBEE, and was 
limited to the direct provision of electricity to a few mining and industrial concerns. 
 
The Electricity Law vertically separated generation, transmission, and 
distribution, with some firms privatized in each of these.  In generation, capitalization 
created three firms:  Corani, Guaracachi and Valle Hermoso, with a total value of about 
140 million US dollars.  Each of these received part of ENDE’s generation activities, with 
the law limiting the market share each can achieve to 35 percent of the NIS.  Exclusive 
rights were initially granted to these companies, but by 1999 entry was liberalized and 
some smaller firms began operations as well. 
 
In transmission, network operation passed from ENDE to the private 
Transportadora de Electricidad, without exclusive rights.  Additionally, the Electricity 
Law forbids the participation of transmission firms in purchase or sale activities, and 
establishes open access and tariff regulation. The privatization transfer was for a value of 
about 40 million US dollars. 
 
In distribution, several types of firms exist after the reform, all of which operate 
under tariff regulation and are subject to quality controls.  First, there is CRE, a pre-
existing distribution cooperative that remained as an independent regional monopoly.  
                                                 
7
 This distinction will be used extensively.  In Bolivia, the main cities are the department capitals.  The 
three largest have populations close to one million and form the so-called central axis:  Cochabamba, La 
Paz/El Alto, and Santa Cruz.  This reflects the fact that Bolivia does not have a single dominant urban 
center, and has one of the lowest urban concentration ratios in the region.  
8
 Empresa Nacional de Electricidad. 
9
 Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Eléctrica Cochabamba. 
10
 Compañía Boliviana de Energía Eléctrica. 
11
 Cooperativa Rural Eléctrica. 
12
 Servicios Eléctricos de Potosí, a municipal company. 
13
 Compañía Eléctrica Sucre, a municipal company. 
Second, there are pre-existing municipal distribution firms that also retained their 
monopolies:  CESSA and SEPSA.  ELFEC, previously a municipal company, now 
operates as a private firm transferred for about 50 million US dollars.  Finally, as stated, 
the private COBEE operated in both generation and distribution.  Its divestiture from 
distribution produced two private local distributors, ELECTROPAZ (La Paz), and ELFEO 
(Oruro).  For all of these distribution firms, tariff regulation consists of several average 
cost caps with productivity factors set using a four-year lag.   Tariffs are updated every 
semester to allow for “pass-through” of energy cost increases. 
 
These reforms, together with the introduction of a load dispatch coordination 
office, have created a wholesale electricity market that seeks to simulate competitive 
conditions.  Partially as a result, the NIS has experienced excess capacity since 1999. 
 
Oil and gas 
 
Prior to reform, virtually all of the hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) industry was 
under the control of state-owned YPFB14, a vertically integrated monopoly.  Limited 
private participation in exploration, as well as in crude oil and natural gas production, 
took place through joint ventures with this company. 
 
With the capitalization process and the introduction of the Hydrocarbons Law, the 
priority became to remove YPFB from production, and to promote a natural gas export 
industry directed towards southern Brazil.  The state intended this industry to support 
(through taxes and royalties) the development of other sectors of the economy, and with 
this goal in mind, reforms and foreign investment were focused on exploration and 
infrastructure.  The inauguration of a pipeline to Brazil in 1999 made this vision a reality.  
 
Further, these reforms were associated with a substantial increase in natural gas 
reserves.  Proven and probable reserves increased from about 5.7 trillion cubic feet in 
1997, to 52.3 in 2002, putting Bolivia in first place in Latin America in free reserves.  
                                                 
14
 Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. 
With reserves now exceeding the served Brazilian and domestic market demand, the 
government is considering new projects, including liquefied natural gas exports to the 
U.S. and Mexico,15 petrochemical and thermoelectric plants, and new export pipelines to 
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Chile.16 As for the domestic market, a general policy of 
private control of all phases up to retail commercialization was adopted.  
 
 
To implement these objectives, the Hydrocarbons Law requires that exploration, 
production and commercialization (upstream) be executed only by private firms in joint 
ventures with YPFB (which remains as the upstream regulator), while placing few 
restrictions on the export and import of petroleum products.  The most important 
operators in the upstream, in terms of reserves (based on 2001 data), are:  Petrobras (34.8 
percent), Maxus (29 percent), Total Exploration (19.8 percent), Andina (5.9 percent), and 
Chaco (4.6 percent). Capitalization resulted in the creation of two firms in the upstream 
sector: Chaco and Andina with a value of 306 and 265 million US dollars respectively. 
 
The 1996 Hydrocarbons law stipulates that the government is entitled to a share of 
the value of production which depends on whether the field in question was discovered 
before or after capitalization:  50 percent of the value of production from old fields (at 
wellhead), and 18 percent from new fields.17  In both cases firms are also required to pay 
a 25 percent profit tax, a 25 percent surtax,18 and a 12.5 percent remittance tax. 
 
In the downstream area, the gas and oil pipelines owned by YPFB were 
transferred to the capitalized Transredes, without exclusive rights and a total value of 264 
million US dollars.19  The administration of other pipelines (poliductos) was entrusted to 
the private Oil Tanking, with the remaining still under YPFB control.  In refinement, most 
                                                 
15
 Given Bolivia’s landlocked condition, at present one of the most debated issues is the choice of an export 
port in either Chile or Peru. 
16
 A regional distributional issue has emerged because most of the new reserves are in the Department of 
Tarija, which stands to receive significant royalty revenues. 
17
 The 1990 Hydrocarbons Law required that all fields pay 50 percent in royalties, plus a profit tax. 
18
 The surtax base is equal to the profit tax base minus 33 percent of accumulated investments and minus 45 
percent of the value of production at each field, up to a maximum of $40 million per year. 
19
 Other operators are Gas Trans Boliviano, Gas Oriente Boliviano, Transierra, and Petrobras. 
of YPFB’s units were transferred to the private Empresa Boliviana de Refinación 
(EBR).20  
 
In commercialization, most of YPFB’s storage terminals were transferred to 
CLHB21 of Oil Tanking as well, but other private firms are also active.  Bottled liquefied 
gas distribution plants are all private, and about nineteen percent of bottling capacity 
continues under YPFB, but is expected to be privatized.  Compressed natural gas service 
stations are all private, and about 15 percent of service stations for liquids continue under 
the state firm.  Airport service stations nationwide were also transferred to the private 
sector. Except for Transredes, all other transfers in the downstream were privatizations 
that reached a total amount of 125 million US dollars. 
 
Mixed ownership continues in network-based natural gas distribution:  SERGAS22 
in Santa Cruz, EMCOGAS23 in Cochabamba, EMDIGAS24 in Sucre and EMTAGAS25 in 
Tarija.  YPFB operates in La Paz, Potosi and Oruro.  The expectation is that these 
companies will also be eventually privatized.26  Despite this activity, the network-based 
natural gas industry is still underdeveloped: by 2001 it included only 14,435 connections.  
Nevertheless, current policy is to increase this to up to 250,000 connections in the next 
five years, as part of an effort to direct energy consumption towards natural gas. 
 
Except for restrictions to vertical integration imposed on firms in gas pipeline 
transportation, the industry structure is flexible and determined by export market needs, 
although mergers and acquisitions are subject to approval.  This has permitted Petrobras, 
in association with others, to integrate several of the phases directed to the natural gas 
exports to Brazil, at the same time as this company participates through EBR in 
refinement for the domestic market. 
 
                                                 
20
 Owned by the Accidental Association Petrobras Bolivia S.A.  
21
 Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos Boliviana. 
22
 Empresa de Servicios de Gas Santa Cruz S.A.M. 
23
 Empresa Cochabambina de Gas S.A.M. 
24
 Empresa Distribuidora de Gas Sucre S.A.M. 
25
 Empresa Tarijeña de Gas. 
26
 The first privatization attempt failed in April 2002. 
Rate of return regulation (with a four year lag) is used for pipeline transportation, 
with a tariff structure that differentiates between domestic and export-related 
transportation.  In natural gas network distribution, tariff regulation has not been 
implemented thus far.  Consumer prices for all petroleum derivatives were initially 
calculated by starting with an international reference price and then adding the costs of 
processing, transportation and commercialization, plus an oil derivatives tax.  In response 
to price volatility, liquefied gas, diesel oil, and gasoline have been subsidized since 2000.  
Further, in a decree (January, 2003) the government froze all consumer prices, eliminated 
the refining margin, and increased the oil derivatives tax -- with the effect of lowering 
prices for the upstream firms. However, due to fiscal pressures generated by subsidies, in 
a recent decree (February, 2004) the government is slowly promoting the return to market 
determined consumer prices. 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Prior to reforms, the telecommunications industry was divided between ENTEL,27 
which covered national and international long distance services, 15 cooperatives with 
monopolies in fixed local telephone services, and Telecel, a private monopoly in the 
cellular market.  Capitalization created the private ENTEL with a value of 610 million US 
dollars and the Telecommunications Law maintained these separations until entry was 
liberalized at the end of 2001.  Until then, ENTEL and the cooperatives retained exclusive 
rights, but the mobile market was opened gradually by allowing the entry of ENTEL-
Movil28 in 1996, and Nuevatel-Viva29 in 2000.   
 
 
For the period prior to entry liberalization, legislation mandated tariff regulation 
for firms that control more than 60 percent of a given market.  This scheme had a similar 
structure in all areas, establishing an initial price cap for different baskets of services, 
                                                 
27
 Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, the State monopoly. 
28
 A division of capitalized ENTEL. 
29
 A joint venture between COMTECO (the Cochabamba cooperative) and Western Wireless International. 
adjusted for inflation and a productivity factor with a three-year lag.  Further, the law 
stipulated annual expansion, quality, and technological goals. 
 
November 2001 marked the end of exclusive rights in all markets.30  Entry 
occurred in the long distance market through AES Corporation (in association with 
Cotel), Teledata, a division of COTAS, Boliviatel, a division of COMTECO, Telecel, 
Nuevatel and ITS.  Additionally, Cotas-Movil has entered the mobile market, while Entel 
has expanded its local network to business clients.  Most of these companies are also 
expanding in the data transmission and internet markets.  Up to the end of 2001, registers 
show 14 firms providing public phone services, 29 in cable TV, 28 in value added 
services, 217 in television, 496 in radio, 6 in data transmission, and 478  private nets. 
 
Additionally, market liberalization was accompanied by a four-year restriction on 
mergers, acquisitions and stock swaps that account for 40 percent or more of total local 
fixed lines in service in the country by one firm (or a group of related firms).  Tariff 
regulation continues where a firm controls more then 60 percent of a given market, 
although this is expected to change with the introduction of dominant firm regulation 
rules, and new rules are being implemented to facilitate inter-connection agreements.  A 
Universal Access and Service Fund has also been proposed (not yet implemented), which 
would be financed by foreign aid and operators’ contribution with the broad objective to 
reach the rural areas and the urban poor.   
 
Transportation 
 
As elsewhere, the Bolivian transportation industry is divided into air, rail, road 
and water segments.  Thus far, capitalization and regulation have only affected the first 
two.  Additionally, the long awaited new Transportation Law has not yet been approved. 
In the air market, prior to reform the state-owned LAB31 and the private 
AEROSUR32 competed in the main regular route domestic market.  LAB also participated 
                                                 
30
 The so-called Decretos de la Apertura where approved by the government a year before. 
31
 Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano. 
in the international market, and the national airport system was administered by the state 
monopoly AASANA.33  LAB was capitalized creating a new private firm, also LAB, with a 
capital contribution of 47 million US dollars, and the main three airport terminals of 
Santa Cruz, La Paz/El Alto and Cochabamba, were transferred to the private SABSA34 as 
concessions.  AASANA retains administrative control of 34 small airports, and AEROSUR 
has entered the international market. 
 
In the case of rail, before reform the sector was dominated by the state monopoly 
ENFE,35 which administered passenger and freight services in the Andean and Eastern 
regions.  In this case, reform created two separate regional firms, FCA36 and FCO,37 
which where then capitalized generating two firms that received a total capital 
contribution of 87 million US dollars. 
 
 
The lack of a sector law has limited the regulatory activities of the Transportation 
Superintendence.  Nevertheless, it was able to advance some actions based on existing 
norms and a few government decrees.  In air transportation, a tariff band was set for the 
regular domestic market, with the stated objective of discouraging anticompetitive 
practices.  Some airport terminal tariffs are also regulated.  In rail transportation, there are 
regulations concerning economic, technical and security aspects of service.   
 
Water 
 
While the above sectors experienced capitalization and the introduction of 
regulation, the water industry has undergone limited changes and encountered significant 
difficulties.  Only one municipal firm, SAMAPA (La Paz/El Alto), was transferred as a 
concession in 1997, to Aguas del Illimani.38  Under the new model, the concession seeks 
                                                                                                                                                 
32
 Compañía Boliviana de Transporte Aéreo Privado. 
33
 Administración de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares a la Navegación Aérea. 
34
 Servicios Aeroportuarios Bolivianos. 
35
 Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles. 
36
 Empresa Ferroviaria Andina. 
37
 Empresa Ferroviaria Oriental. 
38
 The main shareholder is Lyonnaise Des Eaux, with 35 percent. 
to improve internal efficiency, coverage, and quality.  The characteristics of the Aguas 
del Illimani contract reflect this, and the objectives established for the 1997-2001 period 
included: i) 100 percent access to potable water or sewerage (excluding public fountains) 
in the areas of Achachicala and Pampahasi, in the city of La Paz, ii) 82 percent access to 
potable water in the city of El Alto by 2001, of which 50 percent should be expansion 
connections, and 41 percent access to sewerage; and iii) compliance with long-term 
expansion goals.  Quality norms cover aspects related to the sources of water, its quality, 
abundance and pressure; continuity of service, infrastructure efficiency, customer service, 
and emergency preparedness.  Tariff regulation was established under a rate of return 
mechanism with a five-year regulatory lag and no productivity factors.  Additionally, 
tariffs were set in dollar terms payable in bolivianos.39 
 
The expectation was that within a short period, legislation would be in place to 
incorporate the remaining firms into a similar model.  However, the long wait for a 
Potable Water and Sewerage Law (finally approved in 2000), together with significant 
failure in a second transfer of a municipal firm (SEMAPA) to Aguas del Tunari40 in 
Cochabamba, significantly slowed change in this sector.41   
 
Nevertheless, up to 2000 the Water Superintendence was able to incorporate the 
new regulatory regime and sign concessions with existing municipal water firms in 
Cochabamba, Oruro, Sucre, and Potosi -- and with existing cooperatives in Santa Cruz, 
Montero, Trinidad and Guayaramerin.  Some features of the new Law are that municipal 
governments are responsible for the provision of water and sewerage services, a 
responsibility they can perform through private or municipal firms, cooperatives, civil 
organizations and any existing organization in rural communities.  The Bolivian 
population is divided between areas subject to concession or not, depending on whether 
they are financially viable.  Concessions are subject to rate of return regulation with a 
five year regulatory lag, while universal access in non-concession areas should be 
accomplished with government investment. 
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 This last feature has generated wide protest from the inhabitants of El Alto. 
40
 A private firm with the British International Water (with 55 percent) as the main shareholder. 
41
 Described in detail below. 
 Other characteristics of the regulatory system 
 
Thus, the regulatory system (SIRESE) consists of five sector-specific offices 
(electricity, hydrocarbons, telecommunications, water and sewerage, and transportation), 
and one General Superintendence.  By design, the system is financially and 
administratively independent, and Superintendents are appointed by congress for five-
year periods.42  The functions of each Superintendence vary by sector, although they 
generally include: granting rights, regulating tariffs, promoting competition, monitoring 
operator obligations, resolving controversies among firms, imposing sanctions, hearing 
first instance appeals, and receiving consumer claims.  It is important to point out that the 
regulatory system only administers the law – its design is left to the corresponding 
government ministries (although the system can propose legislation). 
 
The General Superintendence evaluates each sector Superintendence once a year, 
considering factors that include compliance with general functions, internal organization, 
and sector performance relative to regulatory objectives.  Aside from its impact on 
specific regulatory activities, SIRESE has also been successful in improving the 
availability of transparent information, and in strengthening the rule of law.   
 
In terms of appeals, the system has a first instance where any operator can appeal 
a decision made by its sector Superintendence.  If the decision is upheld, the operator has 
a second chance to appeal before the General Superintendence.  Even after these stages, 
the operator retains recourse to the judiciary system.  Up to 2001, there had been 453 first 
instance and 148 second instance appeals and 25 cases in the judiciary system. 
 
 
As for consumer protection, the system sets up a first reclamation instance 
directly with the operator.  If the dispute is not settled, the consumer has a second chance 
before the sector Superintendence.  This set-up has revealed a large number of consumer 
complaints in some sectors, particularly telecommunications and electricity. 
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 Seven years in the case of the General Superintendent. 
 The cost of the entire regulatory system was estimated at 0.2 percent of GDP in 
2001, and is fully financed by operators from a levy on gross income (usually less than 1 
percent). This investment has brought important advances, but its effectiveness has been 
hampered by various factors:  instances of instability and lack of continuity of 
Superintendents due to political pressures, lack of a sector law in the cases of water (until 
2000) and transportation (until today), and slow approval of detailed regulations in most 
sectors.  Additionally, at times operators have successfully lobbied the executive and 
legislative branches to bypass the regulatory system.  Consumers often feel they do not 
have enough representation, participation or protection.  Some Superintendencies have 
also been slow to produce transparent information, and/or lacked specialized human 
resources in their earlier stages.  In recent years the system has also had to reduce its 
costs in response to similar initiatives in the rest of the government. 
 
Pension reform and further ownership effects 
 
To summarize, Capitalization transferred 50 percent of state enterprises (and their 
control) to foreign firms.  Additionally, 45-50 percent of shares in the capitalized firms 
were given to the Collective Capitalization Fund (CCF), to be held for the benefit of the 
population at large (we discuss the creation of the CCF and the associated pension reform 
in greater detail below).  Table 4.1 lists the enterprises capitalized in the utilities and 
hydrocarbons sectors, the number of shares issued, and their distribution between the 
capitalizing firm (always 50 percent), the CCF (46.4 percent on average), and the 
employees of each enterprise (3.6 percent on average).  It bears repeating that in the 
second case the shares are made out to the CCF and are represented by the private 
pension fund administrators.  These are not owned by the administrators, the state, or any 
individual citizen. 
 
Table 4.1. 
Distribution of share ownership for the capitalized firms 
 
Firm (Sector) 
 
 
 
Total 
number of 
shares 
 
 Percent 
owned by 
the 
capitalizing 
firm 
 Percent owned by 
the CCF and 
represented by the 
fund 
administrators 
 Percent 
owned 
by 
the firms’ 
workers 
 Ferroviaria Oriental (Transportation) 2,296,982 50 49.91 0.09 
 Ferroviaria Andina (Transportation) 1,322,448 50 49.93 0.07 
 Valle Hermoso (Electricity) 2,927,322 50 49.87 0.13 
 Guaracachi (Electricity) 3,358,284 50 49.83 0.17 
 Corani (Electricity) 3,144,486 50 47.23 2.77 
 Transredes (Oil and gas) 10,048,120 50 33.55 16.45 
 Petrolera Chaco (Oil and gas) 16,099,320 50 48.94 1.06 
 Petrolera Andina (Oil and gas) 13,439,520 50 48.92 1.08 
 ENTEL (Telecommunications) 12,808,988 50 47.47 2.53 
 LAB  (Transportation) 2,293,764 50 48.64 0.99 
 Mean 50 46.42 3.57 
Source:  Boletín de Pensiones 1999, Superintendencia de Pensiones, Valores y seguros. 
 
 
The CCF receives the dividends due to it from its shares in the capitalized firms.  
Between 1997 and 2000, these represented between 0.39 and 0.55 percent of GDP per 
year, with the most important contribution coming from the telecommunications sector.  
In 2001 dividends grew to 0.65 percent of GDP with the most important contributions 
coming from the energy sector, however, in 2002 they dropped to 0.45 percent of GDP. 
 
 
 The fund has a significant social impact as a source of transfers to private citizens.  
These include the Bonosol (an old-age benefit), funeral expenses, investment in 
Individual Capitalization Funds (pension plans actually owned by individual citizens), 
and subsequently, the Bolivida.  The Bonosol was a cash payment equivalent to 248 US 
dollars in 1997, directed at all citizens 65 or older – a substantial transfer given that 
Bolivia’s GDP per capita is about 1,000 dollars.43   In total, 56.5 million dollars were paid 
to about 320,000 people.   
 
 The Bonosol was only paid once before the administration that implemented the 
capitalization process left government.  Immediately a debate began on whether the CCF 
in fact had enough funds to continue payments at that pace. The next administration did 
not make payments for a period and then switched to the Bolivida, which it began 
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  By December 31, 1999, the CCF had also been used to acquire shares of the ICF for approximately 14.7 
million dollars, and for the payment of funeral expenses worth 2.3 million dollars. 
disbursing in December of 2000.  It consists of 60 US dollars for every citizen above the 
age of 65.  Retroactive payments for 1998 and 1999 ($60 per year) were also made, and 
by March of 2001 had benefited 150,000 individuals. 
 
 The year 2002 witnessed the return to government of the administration that 
originally implemented capitalization, and hence a desire to return to the original 
(roughly $240) Bonosol.  Because of further reductions in the flow of dividends, 
however, the CCF now clearly does not have sufficient funds to make payments at this 
level.  We return to this issue, including how the government plans to make up the 
shortfall, below. 
 
Effects:  Firms’ performance  
 
 Capitalization and privatization entailed major changes to the industrial 
organization of the sectors they affected, and to the conditions under which the firms in 
each of them operate.  In this section, we study these reforms’ effects on several aspects 
of firm performance. 
 
Investment 
 
Investment is a key parameter in any evaluation of the capitalization process, 
since increasing it was an explicit objective.  Table 4.2 summarizes the sector-specific 
information presented earlier, but complements it with the investment activity observed 
in each case.  The privatization values presented correspond only to the oil and gas, 
electricity, telecommunications and transportation sectors. 
 
Table 4.2. 
Resources/investment generated by privatization and capitalization 
 
Firms created by the 
reform 
Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$US) 
Capitalization 
value 
(Millions of 
$US) 
Investment as 
of 2002 
(as  percent of 
commitment)
(1) 
Company / 
institution in 
charge of 
investment 
Oil and gas 
Chaco S.A.  
Andina S.A. 
Transredes S.A. 
EBR S.A. 
CLHB S.A. 
Airport Service Stations 
 
 
1997 
1997 
1997 
2000 
2000 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
102.00 
  12.05 
  11.10 
 
 
306.66 
264.77 
263.50 
 
 
 89.2 
 108.9 
        102.5 
 
 
Chaco S.A. 
Andina S.A. 
Transredes S.A. 
TGN-Investment 
TGN-Investment 
TGN-Investment 
Electricity 
Corani S.A. 
Guaracachi S.A. 
Valle Hermoso S.A. 
TDE S.A. 
Elfec S.A. 
 
 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1997 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
  39.90 
  50.30 
 
 
  58.79 
  47.13 
  33.92 
 
 
  74.7 
150.0 
111.9 
 
 
Corani S.A. 
Guaracachi S.A. 
Valle Hermoso S.A. 
ENDE Residual 
TGN-Investment 
Telecommunications 
ENTEL S.A. 
 
 
1995 
  
 
610.00 
 
 
  21.4 
 
 
ENTEL S.A. 
Transportation 
LAB S.A. 
FCO S.A. 
FCA S.A. 
 
 
1997 
1996 
1996 
  
 
  47.47 
  25.85 
  13.25 
 
 
        100.0 
241.6 
167.6 
 
 
LAB S.A. 
FCO S.A. 
FCA S.A. 
Total  215.35     1,671.34   
(1) Based only on the amounts accepted by the regulatory system, Delegado para la Capitalización 
 
 
As this table illustrates, most firms have exceeded their investment commitments, 
and from this perspective the process seems to have delivered.  Firms under concession 
agreements (Aguas del Illimani, and SABSA), furthermore, have also made investments in 
order to comply with specific contractual goals that are not registered in the table.   
 
Employment and labor productivity 
 
A frequent critique of privatization is that it leads to unemployment.  In this 
section, we use administrative information to explore the extent to which this is true for 
Bolivia.  As context, the economy-wide unemployment rate went up significantly after 
1997, more than doubling (to about 8 percent) by 2002.  Naturally, external or other 
macroeconomic shocks may account for this; we postpone a discussion of these until 
later.  The focus in this section is simply to see if the employment changes brought about 
by privatization and capitalization could account for this change.  Due to data restrictions, 
in this section we arrive only at a partial answer.  Additionally, we include information 
on the evolution of labor productivity, and once again we proceed through the analysis by 
sector.  Due to space restrictions, we omit a fair amount of quantitative data from the 
following discussion; for interested readers, this is available in Barja, McKenzie and 
Urquiola (2004). 
 
Electricity 
 
In generation the number of employees in each firm remained more or less 
constant between 1995 and 1998, with some declines by 1999.  Associated with increases 
in output , these trends have resulted in increases in labor productivity, which for the 
1995-1999 period, range between 14 and 100 percent. 
 
 In distribution enterprises can be split into two groups:  ELECTROPAZ, CRE and 
ELFEC, which operate in the three largest cities (La Paz/Elto, Santa Cruz, and 
Cochabamba, respectively), and CESSA, SEPSA and ELFEO, which operate in smaller 
markets.  Overall there was a downward trend in employment and a more consistent, 
increasing trend for labor productivity.  In La Paz/El Alto, for instance ELECTROPAZ 
consistently reduced its employment level between 1996 and 1999, and increased its 
productivity by 59 percent in the same period.  In Santa Cruz, CRE reduced personnel up 
to 1997 and raised its productivity by 43 percent (it increased employment in 1998, but 
this did not reverse the productivity increases).  In Cochabamba, ELFEC reduced 
employment up to 1998, and increased its productivity by 105 percent in the same period.  
Two firms, CRE and SEPSA, actually increased their employment levels between 1995 
and the most recent observation. 
 
 
 To summarize, both generation and distribution firms seem to, on average, have 
experienced relatively moderate decreases in employment levels, particularly two or three 
years after they initiated operations (in the case of capitalized firms), while at the same 
time enjoying significant and consistent increases in labor productivity.   
 
Telecommunications 
  In ENTEL, employment peaked in 1997.  ENTEL-Movil initiated its operations in 
1996 and possibly completed hiring in 1997, which may account for an increase in the 
number of workers between 1996 and 1997.  In the subsequent years, there is a 
continuous decline at relatively large and increasing annual rates, 15 percent in 1998, and 
19 and 30 percent in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  Labor productivity, as measured by 
long distance minutes per employee continued to grow until 1998, but a decline took 
place in 1999 despite falling employment levels.  This reflects weakening demand for 
long distance services, induced by the recession and perhaps by growing internet use. 
 
In the case of cellular services, the data record is incomplete, but one might 
venture that the experience of Telecel reflects that of both operators.  Telecel increased its 
employment levels continuously up to 1996, but then reduced them in 1997, partially 
reacting to ENTEL-Movil’s entry and the onset of price competition.  Increases in labor 
productivity also display an upward trend during this period, reaching 152 percent by 
1996.  Telecel resumed its employment increases after 1997, and its personnel count in 
2000 was practically double that of 1996.  In spite of this, labor productivity continued to 
increase, by 57 percent in 1997 and 172 percent in 1998.  These positive results reflect 
expansion due to price competition and quality-related improvements. 
 
 For local telephony, in all cases there is consistent growth in labor productivity, 
reflecting increases in the number of connections.  Nevertheless, some operators reduced 
personnel in some years, such as COTEL in 1995, COTAS in 1993-96 and 1998-99, and 
COMTECO during 1998-99. 
 
So far, we have reviewed the electricity and telecommunications sectors, 
concluding that employment peaked around 1997, so that one cannot rule out that 
capitalization might have caused some reductions in personnel.  The employment levels 
in these sectors are quite small, however – they account for less than six thousand jobs 
out of more than 1.3 million people working in the capital cities alone.  Nonetheless, the 
job losses in the previous tables can account for about 3 percent of the aggregate job 
losses in capital cities between 1995 and 2000, so the effect, while small, is not 
negligible. 
 
Oil and gas 
 
YPFB did display employment decreases after the 1997 reforms, but it is 
important to distinguish between the upstream (exploration and production) and 
downstream (transportation and commercialization) activities.  Before reform, the 
number of employees in the upstream sector fluctuated around 25 percent of the total.  
These were substituted by the capitalized ANDINA and CHACO, which in 1998 operated 
with about 40 percent of the total upstream personnel YPFB had in 1996.  The continuing 
decrease in employment for YPFB, even beyond 1999, happened as one by one all of the 
activities in the downstream sector were being privatized. 
 
Although the number of employees in oil and gas transportation (represented by 
TRANREDES) is known, there is no available information for the rest of the downstream 
activities (industrialization, storage, distribution and commercialization). 
 
Taken together, the evidence on employment levels suggests that capitalization 
was indeed associated with reductions in employment, amid increasing output and labor 
productivity.  In the context of the broader Bolivian employment picture, however, there 
is (incomplete) evidence that the direct employment losses do not account for more than 
a small proportion of the unemployment increases that started in 1998.   
  
Profitability and flows of funds 
 
Financial results are another relevant firm-level outcome. In this section we cover 
issues related to the performance of state and private enterprises in the industries of 
interest.  Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the main state firms for 1990-2001.  
One has to keep in mind that part of YPFB was capitalized in 1997, ENDE and ENTEL in 
1995 and ENFE in 1996.  However, except for ENTEL and LAB, residuals of these firms 
remained, with privatization of parts of them occurring at a later time.  If one looks at 
current expenditures over revenues up to the capitalization year, the data show that 
except for ENDE and ENFE in 1995,44 the firms considered did cover their operating 
expenses and were capable of making short term transfers to the state, although some, 
like ENDE and ENTEL, were in a more comfortable position.  When one considers total 
(which includes capital) expenditures over revenues, however, in most cases the state 
firms were in deficit, except for YPFB in 1995-97, ENDE in 1991 and 1993-94, and 
ENTEL in 1992 and 1994-95.  Thus, most of the time state firms had to finance their 
investments through debt,45 and in many years there were investment shortfalls.   
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 ENDE was capitalized in 1995. 
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 In general state firms could not obtain commercial credit, and their debt consisted mainly of 
concessionary credits from bilateral or multilateral agencies, with government guarantees. 
Table 4.3. 
Cash flow statistics for government firms, 1990-01 
 
Firms 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
YPFB 
Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP percent 
T/GDP percent 
 
 
0.90 
1.08 
2.17 
7.92 
 
 
0.89 
1.05 
2.16 
8.85 
 
 
0.90 
1.06 
1.86 
7.21 
 
 
0.95 
1.08 
1.65 
6.47 
 
 
0.90 
1.07 
1.67 
5.93 
 
 
0.88 
0.99 
0.98 
5.52 
 
 
0.90 
0.97 
0.63 
5.79 
 
 
0.95 
0.96 
0.10 
3.34 
 
 
1.05 
1.06 
0.05 
3.41 
 
 
0.97 
0.98 
0.08 
3.09 
 
 
0.95 
0.95 
0.00 
-0.18 
 
 
0.97 
0.97 
0.01 
-0.30 
ENDE 
Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP percent 
T/GDP percent 
 
 
0.65 
0.94 
0.32 
0.06 
 
 
0.63 
1.14 
0.55 
0.07 
 
 
0.63 
1.43 
1.01 
0.02 
 
 
0.58 
0.95 
0.53 
0.15 
 
 
0.62 
0.82 
0.33 
0.19 
 
 
1.31 
1.16 
0.52 
0.73 
 
 
0.87 
1.64 
0.32 
0.16 
 
 
0.55 
0.82 
0.09 
0.04 
 
 
1.12 
1.35 
0.03 
0.00 
 
 
1.02 
0.69 
0.01 
-0.02 
 
 
2.05 
1.39 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
2.15 
1.54 
0.01 
-0.01 
ENTEL 
Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP percent 
T/GDP percent 
 
 
0.72 
1.23 
0.57 
0.41 
 
 
0.70 
1.04 
0.40 
0.49 
 
 
0.72 
0.89 
0.24 
0.44 
 
 
0.84 
1.15 
0.45 
0.63 
 
 
0.88 
0.98 
0.14 
0.80 
 
 
0.87 
0.93 
0.09 
0.71 
      
ENFE 
Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP percent 
T/GDP percent 
 
 
0.97 
1.44 
0.39 
0.06 
 
 
0.84 
1.05 
0.28 
-0.10 
 
 
0.77 
1.07 
0.32 
0.12 
 
 
0.95 
1.12 
0.24 
-0.09 
 
 
0.88 
1.05 
0.18 
0.07 
 
 
1.03 
1.11 
0.09 
0.06 
 
 
0.97 
0.86 
0.00 
-0.20 
 
 
2.68 
1.33 
0.01 
-0.02 
 
 
2.33 
1.39 
0.00 
-0.01 
 
 
6.91 
1.42 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
1.88 
1.33 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
4.26 
1.49 
0.00 
0.00 
ALL 
I/GDP percent 
T/GDP percent 
 
 
3.87 
8.65 
 
 
3.75 
9.50 
 
 
4.08 
8.00 
 
 
3.29 
7.44 
 
 
2.63 
6.57 
 
 
2.15 
7.75 
 
 
1.69 
6.14 
 
 
0.66 
3.46 
 
 
0.33 
3.34 
 
 
0.22 
3.13 
 
 
0.17 
-0.22 
 
 
0.17 
-0.33 
Note:  C. Exp. = Current expenditures including current transfers; C. Rev = Current revenues including current transfers and 
operational revenues; T. Exp. = Total expenditures including current and capital expenditures; T. Rev. = Total revenues including 
current and capital revenues; I = Investment; T = Taxes, royalties and net transfers to government. 
Source:  Unidad de ? iscal? ación ? iscal. 
 
The magnitude of these firms’ investment can be observed as a percentage of 
GDP, and in relation to all state enterprise investment.46  Additionally, the table describes 
the level of taxes, royalties and net transfers to the government, also as a percentage of 
GDP.  In both of these areas, YPFB stands out in size.   
 
During the post-capitalization period, the picture for residual firms in terms of 
investment and net contributions changes substantially, as one would expect.  However, it 
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 Infrastructure sectors, hydrocarbons, mineral and industrial. 
is worrisome that the other indicators worsen dramatically, particularly for the residuals 
of ENDE and ENFE. 
 
Moving on to private firms and to the 1997-2000 period, Table 4.4 presents:  I) 
operational costs over revenues – a rough measure of internal efficiency, and ii) net profit 
over equity.  In electricity generation, Corani and COBEE show better performances than 
Guaracachi and Valle Hermoso under both of these criteria (note that the first two are 
hydroelectric and the latter two thermoelectric).  In distribution, the year 2000 shows 
ELECTROPAZ with the lowest expenditure to revenue ratio and the highest return on 
equity, followed by ELFEC and ELFEO.  The remaining firms are cooperatives (CRE) or 
have municipal participation. 
 
Table 4.4. 
Performance indicators of main firms in regulated sectors 
 
Operational costs / Op. revenues After tax profit / Equity Sector/Company 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Electricity generation           
CORANI 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.48 0.6 12.2 7.2 9.3 8.0 5.2 
VALLE HERMOSO 1.02 0.90 1.02 1.01 2.5 2.6 4.8 4.7 3.7 -0.9 
GUARACACHI 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.82 0.8 3.6 5.6 4.4 5.3 2.7 
COBEE 0.65 0.69 0.59 0.63 0.5 11.1 7.2 11.6 9.8 14.3 
TDE-Transmission   0.66 0.65 0.65   5.2 6.2 6.6 
Electricity distribution           
ELECTROPAZ 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.84 0.86 11.1 10.9 14.2 14.4 6.9 
CRE 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.94 6.0 6.8 3.0 2.8 2.3 
ELFEC 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.95 10.1 9.1 10.3 14.2 7.2 
CESSA 0.93 0.90 0.77 0.97 0.97 4.6 8.4 0.6 7.5 5.7 
SEPSA 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.94 6.8 6.5 6.3 4.4 4.2 
ELFEO 0.81 0.77 0.82 0.91 0.87 12.4 16.9 12.4 8.2 4.6 
Oil and gas           
Andina(1)  0.92 0.91 0.75 0.00  0.7 1.3 6.1 0.0 
Chaco(1)  0.76 0.54 0.38 0.37  -2.1 6.1 9.6 8.5 
Transredes(2) 0.58(3) 0.57 0.61 1.60 0.87 7.3 6.0 8.3   -4.0 2.5 
Telecommunications           
ENTEL 0.80 0.83 0.94   6.2 8.9 5.3   
TELECEL 0.95 0.84 N/d   -24.3 33.4 N/A   
COTEL 1.32 1.29 1.30   -30.5 -9.4 -11.0   
COTAS 0.89 0.89 0.88   1.7 0.5 0.6   
COMTECO 0.85 0.73 0.98   3.3 5.2 2.8   
Airlines and airports           
LAB 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.03  2.5 -5.8 0.4 -14.0  
AEROSUR 1.18 0.98 1.04 0.83  -19.3 1.6 -9.4 0.0  
SABSA 0.93 0.97 1.10 1.16  33.3 12.0 -15.7 -83.9  
Rail transportation           
FCA 0.85 0.85 0.93 0.86  13.6 7.3 8.7 8.2  
FCO 0.57 0.59 0.71 0.68  27.0 28.5 15.5 15.2  
Water           
Aguas del Illimani 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.64 0.65 0.9 15.0 18.4 4.9 -4.9 
Source:  General Superintendence. 
(1) For years ending in March.  (2) Includes revenues from the deferred account.  (3) Corresponds to seven months of operations. 
 
For oil and gas we only have information on Chaco, Andina, and Transredes.  In the 
upstream activities both Chaco and Andina have increasingly improved their internal efficiency 
and return on equity over the years.  Transredes, the main firm in pipeline transportation, has 
managed to generate annual surpluses, except for the year 2000 when it incurred a capital loss 
due to an oil spill. 
 
Moving on to telecommunications, the data shows that internal efficiency in 
ENTEL and COMTECO deteriorated in 1999 relative to previous years.  This result has 
determined a drop in our measure of profitability from 8.9 to 5.3 percent, and from 5.2 to 
2.8 percent respectively.  For COTAS and COTEL the efficiency indicator has remained 
stable, but COTEL has generated loses every year, compared to weak profits for COTAS.  
Further, TELECEL improved its internal efficiency between 1997-98 (with no available 
information for 1999). 
 
In the airline sector, the data show that LAB managed to break even in 1999, but 
incurred significant losses by 2000.  The company that capitalized it, VASP, departed in 
2002 under allegations of asset stripping.  At that point LAB was taken over by Bolivian 
investors who allegedly paid a “gift” price for it. AEROSUR, which participated in the 
domestic market only, produced a profit on only one of the years considered.  SABSA, the 
airport terminal operator, has experienced deteriorating performance since 1997, when it 
had a positive margin, to 2000, when it experienced a dramatic loss. 
 
For the years covered, rail transport presents a more positive picture.  FCA made a 13.6 
percent return on equity in 1997, although by 2000 this fell to 8.2 percent.  For FCO, the 1997-
98 profit rate fluctuated around 28 percent, and fell to 15 percent by 1999-2000.  Nonetheless, it 
has been identified as the most profitable firm among those capitalized.  This may partially 
reflect the fact that it monopolizes the Santa Cruz-Puerto Suarez route, where it does not face 
trucking competition. 
 
Finally, the table also presents performance indicators for Aguas del Illimani, the 
only privately administered firm in the water industry.  The indicators show a constant 
tendency toward improvement during the 1997-99 period; however, the numbers drop 
significantly in 2000. 
 
Effects:  Access, Prices, and Welfare 
 
Clearly, capitalization and privatization substantially affected the utilities sector.  
To assess their impact from a social point of view, it is key to know how these processes 
affected the consumers of these services.  Specifically, privatization can affect consumers 
in three main ways. First, if it results in expansions of utilities’ networks, then previously 
unserved households might start consuming the services. Second, for consumers who 
already have access, privatization may bring about changes in prices. Third, privatization 
may affect the quality of service provided. This section considers the joint effect of 
access and price changes on consumer welfare, and also discusses quality changes. We 
focus on the utilities sectors of electricity, telecommunications and water, for which 
direct consumer expenditure data is available. Data on transportation is not available by 
type of transport,47 while the privatization of oil and gas is likely to have had less direct 
effects on consumers due to its export-intensive nature.48 
 
 It is worth mentioning first that increasing access to infrastructure, especially 
water and electricity, has long been regarded as an essential component of poverty 
reduction strategies. Unsatisfied basic needs poverty measures are in fact directly based 
on access to such services. Additionally, electricity supply helps to generate income 
among the poor, as reflected in the fact that 78 percent of all municipal workshops in 
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 This is unfortunate to the extent that transportation tends to be a greater part of poor households’ budgets. 
48
 Although the price volatility introduced by liberalization could have important welfare consequences. 
Bolivia’s rural areas identified rural electrification as the most important action in 
combating poverty (GOB, 2001). 
  
Changes in Access 
 
The fifth and seventh rounds of the Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (EIH), taken 
in 1992 and 1994 respectively, and the first round of the Encuesta Continua de Hogares 
(ECH), taken in 1999, can be used to examine changes in access to utilities service in 
periods before and after the capitalization reforms (of 1995 and 1996). These data are 
described in detail in Appendix 4A, while Appendix 4B details the specific questions 
used to construct different definitions of access.  
 
Table 4.5 shows the evolution of access to basic services from 1992 to 1999 in the 
department capitals, by income decile. Access to telephone and electricity is determined 
by a question directly asking whether the household has the service or not. Calculations 
for communications, which include telephone and mail, are based on whether the 
household reports positive expenditure on this item in the past month. A household is 
considered to have access to water if it has a pipe connection to the building its dwelling 
is part of.   
 
Table 4.5. Access to infrastructure in Bolivia (urban capitals)  
by household per capita deciles 
 
  Percentage of Households in Decile with Access 
 Telephone  Communications Electricity Water  
Decile 1994 1999 1992 1994 1999 1992 1994 1999 1992 1994 1999 
1 0.9 8.3 1.2 2.9 13.5 85.4 89.2 98.9 52.2 64.5 89.1 
2 4.5 15.8 2.7 7.2 18.0 88.5 93.3 95.0 59.8 68.1 82.5 
3 4.5 20.4 6.6 8.1 27.4 90.3 93.2 97.9 67.4 74.7 89.1 
4 6.4 30.7 8.1 9.4 45.0 90.9 94.6 96.9 72.5 73.2 89.0 
5 8.8 38.6 13.9 13.4 57.4 94.1 96.6 100.0 71.9 76.4 87.8 
6 16.1 51.1 18.5 22.3 62.5 94.8 97.7 100.0 79.4 83.0 95.7 
7 20.8 60.4 21.7 27.4 69.4 96.0 98.1 100.0 85.0 85.1 98.7 
8 28.6 62.1 29.6 35.6 75.7 97.3 98.0 100.0 84.9 91.1 97.7 
9 41.5 72.2 45.0 48.6 86.0 98.5 98.8 99.9 88.4 91.5 95.7 
10 60.3 77.4 53.5 69.7 85.1 97.6 99.7 100.0 92.0 95.5 97.8 
Total 20.0 42.5 21.1 25.5 52.7 93.6 96.0 98.8 76.3 80.6 92.1 
Notes:            
Access to Telephone, Electricity and Water is based on direct questions as to whether the household 
owns a phone, has electricity or uses electricity for lighting, and has the water network come to the building where they live. 
Access to communications (telephone and mail) occurs if the household had positive expenditure on this  
item in the last month. Access to telephones is not available separately for 1992.   
 
Access to all services increased between 1994 and 1999. Note that this was in the 
context of one of the more rapid urbanization process in Latin America, which puts 
pressure on urban infrastructure as low-income rural immigrants move into cities. In the 
absence of significant investment, coverage rates would in all likelihood have declined. 
Changes in access by per capita household expenditure decile are also reported in 
Table 4.6. Coverage for electricity was the highest pre-privatization, with more than 98 
percent of the top half of the distribution having access in 1994. As a consequence, 
improvements were mainly concentrated on the poor, with an additional 9.6 percent of 
the poorest decile gaining access between 1994 and 1999.  
 
Access to water was also initially very high among the richer deciles, but lower 
than access to electricity among the poor. Each of the bottom seven deciles had an 
increase in access of more than 10 percent between 1994 and 1999, with a remarkable 
additional 24.6 percent of the poorest decile gaining access to water. In contrast, access to 
telephones is much less common, and the increase in access is seen to have occurred 
mainly for the mid and upper parts of the overall distribution.   
 
While one sees increases in access following the privatization, Table 4.6 shows 
that access was also increasing before privatization. To estimate whether privatization 
caused a change in the rate of increase, one can consider the difference between the 
annual growth rate in access between 1994 and 1999 (post-privatization) and the annual 
growth rates in access between 1992 and 1994 (pre-privatization).  
 
This simple counterfactual will tend to bias downwards any effect of 
privatization, as access rates cannot grow beyond 100 percent, and one would hence 
expect growth rates to fall as coverage grows. Nevertheless, the two panels in Table 4.15 
do show positive double-differences for most deciles for communications and for the 
middle deciles for water. The rate of growth in access to electricity in contrast has 
slowed, but as access is now 97 percent or above for all but the second decile, this is to be 
expected.  
 
Table 4.6. How much of the change in access is due to privatization? 
Difference in Differences   
(1994-99 annual change less 1992-94 annual change)  
          
Decile Communications Electricity Water  
1 1.3 0.0 -1.2  
2 -0.1 -2.1 -1.3  
3 3.1 -0.5 -0.8  
4 6.5 -1.4 2.8  
5 9.0 -0.5 0.1  
6 6.1 -1.0 0.7  
7 5.5 -0.7 2.6  
8 5.0 0.0 -1.7  
9 5.7 0.1 -0.7  
10 -5.0 -1.0 -1.3  
Total 3.2 -0.6 0.1  
           
Access to Water by Region and Expenditure Quintile 
           
              Difference in Triple  
 La Paz/El Alto Other main cities Difference    Difference 
Quintile 1992 1994 1999 1992 1994 1999 92-94 94-99   
1 53.3 66.1 88.8 57.4 66.4 82.5 3.8 6.6 -0.6 
2 70.7 73.3 93.3 69.8 74.2 86.9 -1.8 7.4 2.4 
3 76.0 77.4 95.6 75.7 80.6 89.4 -3.5 9.5 3.6 
4 87.1 89.8 100.0 84.1 87.5 97.3 -0.7 0.4 0.4 
5 96.2 94.6 100.0 87.8 93.1 95.4 -6.9 3.1 4.1 
Overall 78.1 81.7 94.4 75.6 80.3 90.7 -1.0 2.2 1.0 
           
Notes: The difference-in-difference is the change in La Paz/Alto less the change in the other  
main cities of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. The Triple difference is the difference between  
one-fifth the double difference over 1994-99 and one half the double difference over 1992-94.
 
A second attempt to determine whether privatization increased access is to 
compare changes in access to water in La Paz/El Alto, the only city with a sustained 
concession, to changes in other main cities.  This is particularly relevant because the 
government chose to award the concession in La Paz/El Alto on the basis of bids for the 
number of new connections to be offered at a predetermined tariff level, which suggests 
that increases in access were one of the goals of this process.  
 The second panel of Table 4.6 shows that, for the top four quintiles, access to 
water increased faster in the other cities from 1992 to 1994 than it did in La Paz/El Alto. 
However, following the water concession, access increased more between 1994 and 1999 
in La Paz/El Alto. The resulting triple difference is positive overall for the richer four 
quintiles, suggesting privatization did increase access. In contrast, the access of the 
poorest quintile in La Paz/El Alto increased at a faster rate than that of the poorest 
quintile in other main cities, both before and after privatization, so that the overall triple 
difference is small. 
 
In the case of telephone service, the increase in access is also observed when one looks at 
penetration rates for the whole country, not just the largest cities. Growth is fairly stagnant until 
1996, after which there was extremely rapid growth in cellular and internet, and some growth in 
both fixed line and public phone provision. Cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants grew from 
0.27 in 1996 to 6.96 in 2000, overtaking the number of residential main lines per inhabitant in 
this period (ITU, 2001). Over the years, there has also been an effort to extend telephone 
coverage to the rural area, and in fact the capitalization contract with ENTEL contained clauses 
in this regard. Rural lines saw some growth, from 0.65 lines per 1000 rural inhabitants in 1997 to 
2.03 lines per 1000 rural inhabitants in 2000.49 While the number of connections is quite low, 
these new connections can have substantial welfare impacts for the rural population. 
 
Although improvements in technology are likely to be responsible for some of 
these increases, it is likely that the rapid growth rates observed would not have been 
achieved without liberalization in general, and the introduction of competition in cellular 
services in particular. Access gains from cellular are particularly important in Bolivia, 
due to the fact that the local telephone cooperatives were charging $1200-1500 for access 
to local lines (an amount which entitles the buyer to one share of the cooperative).50 
Given that the GDP per capita in 1996 was about $1,000, this put the cost of a local fixed 
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 Rural lines from the Telecommunications Superintendent, SITTEL, http://www.sittel.gov.bo. 
50
 See Fernando Cossio Muñoz (1999) “Bolivia: Telecommunications Sector”, TradePort Industry Sector 
Analysis Reports, http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/bolivia/isa/isar0001.html, accessed 5 September 
2002. 
line beyond the reach of many consumers. The introduction of cellular competition 
dramatically reduced these access costs of access, as will be described in the next section.  
 
Changes in Prices 
 
In spite of the popular perception that privatization results in price increases, its 
theoretical impact in this regard is uncertain. Much depends on the details of the process 
itself, as the government has a choice of awarding the contract on the basis of highest 
amount bid, or lowest tariff offered. The existing amount of direct government subsidies 
will also determine whether the private firm needs to raise prices to cover losses. Prices 
may also change due to rebalancing, if there is cross-subsidization prior to privatization. 
Private firms may also act to reduce illegal connections, resulting in de facto price 
increases for consumers who previously obtained the service illegally. The amount of 
competition and regulation is also important: if private management is more efficient and 
the private firm faces competition or regulation, then prices can fall.51 
 
In Bolivia, there are several reasons to believe that prices should not have 
increased dramatically after the privatizations. First, because capitalization proceeds were 
not used by the government to cover deficits, there were fewer incentives to build high 
tariffs into the contracts. Second, the promotion of competition and the implementation of 
regulation may have also helped reduce the pressure for price increases.  
 
Furthermore, as existing firms were often cooperatives or private already (e.g. 
COBEE in electricity), the government’s distributional goals were not always being 
implemented through utility prices.  Moreover, the autonomous nature of the existing 
firms is likely to have made illegal connections less of a problem, although our surveys 
do not enable us to look at changes in this regard. Finally, in telecommunications, the 
state long distance provider ENTEL was always separate from the local cooperatives, so 
that the typical cross-subsidization of long distance and local rates was not an issue. 
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 See Chapter 2 of Estache et al. (2002) for more discussion of these issues. 
The household surveys used in this chapter do not collect information on the 
prices paid by individual households for infrastructure services, but instead only on their 
expenditure. As a consequence, we are forced to use aggregate price indices at either the 
city or the national level to assess the changes in prices after privatization.  
 
Figure 4.1 displays the evolution of an index of the tariff of 10 cubic meters of 
water, relative to the consumer price index, for the central axis cities of La Paz/El Alto, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.52  Prices are seen to be rising in La Paz/El Alto prior to the 
concession in 1997, and to continue to rise until 1998. However, prices rose faster in 
Santa Cruz, where reforms did not take place, and so relative to the other cities, 
privatization resulted in slower increases in La Paz/El Alto. Using the weighted average 
price in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz to predict what price increases would have been in 
La Paz/El Alto in the absence of privatization, we therefore find that privatization 
lowered prices by 10.5 percent relative to the average in other cities.53 
Figure 4.1: Water Prices in Bolivia 1992-99
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 Data supplied by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 
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 See Table 18 in Barja, McKenzie and Urquiola (2004) for full details of this calculation. 
In the case of water, price increases are especially interesting because they led to 
what is surely the most spectacular failure in the privatization process.  In 1999, Aguas de 
Tunari, a subsidiary of Bechtel Enterprises, was the sole bidder in an auction for a water 
concession in the city of Cochabamba. The city faced a chronic water shortage, with 
many poor households unconnected to the network, while state subsidies went mainly to 
the middle class and industry.54  
 
When the first monthly bills arrived in January 2000, consumers experienced 
price increases that averaged 51 percent, with some households experiencing increases in 
their water bills of more than 90 percent due to small increases in their usage coupled 
with the large rise in price.55 Figure 4.1 shows water prices had fallen during 1997-99, so 
that the price rises came as even more of a shock to consumers.  The poorest consumers, 
for whom water usage consisted of only an indoor toilet and outside water tap, 
experienced price rises of 43 percent on average, with some consumers reporting a 
doubling of their bill.56 Prices rose even more for richer consumers, with the middle class 
experiencing average price increases of 57 percent and commercial users experiencing 
price increases of 59 percent.  
In addition, the exclusive rights granted to the concessionaire affected local 
interests, including those of people who had invested in private wells and distribution 
systems.  An added element was that Aguas del Tunari had agreed to invest $200 million 
in the popular Misicuni water provision project, 30 percent of which had to come from 
equity and the rest from debt.  The tariff increase occurred while the company had not yet 
complied with the equity commitment, and the debt financing had yet to be lined up.  The 
perception arose that the firm was trying to finance its equity share off the tariff 
increases.   
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 See “Letter from Bolivia: Leasing the Rain’’ by William Finnegan, in the New Yorker, April 8 2002. 
55
 Source:  http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/waterbills/waterbills-global.htm 
56
 Source: SEMAPA analysis reported in “Bechtel Vs. Bolivia: The Water Rate Hikes by Bechtel’s 
Bolivian Company (Aguas del Tunari) The Real Numbers”, The Democracy Center, 
http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/waterbills/waterbills-global.htmw, accessed August 20, 2002. 
 
 
In this context, the so-called “water war” took place, and involved local labor 
strikes, demonstrations, and violent confrontations that ended with the cancellation of the 
concession and the expulsion of Aguas del Tunari from Cochabamba.  Control of the 
water network reverted to SEMAPA, the old public utility.  
 
Moving on, Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of electricity prices in Bolivia over 
the 1990s for each of the central axis cities. Price indices relative to the overall CPI are 
plotted for the mean residential tariff, and for the minimum electricity tariff for 0-20 
Kwh/month, which is likely to be most relevant for poorer households.  
 
Figure 4.2: Electricity Prices in Bolivia 1992-99
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Prices have generally risen since the reforms of 1994/95, except for the minimum 
tariff in Cochabamba, which decreased 14 percent between 1994 and 1999.  
Nevertheless, since 1998 some price decreases have been realized. On average, prices 
increased by 26.2 percent between 1994 and 1999. As prices were increasing prior to 
privatization, we use the trend of price increases before privatization (over 1992-94) and  
extrapolate to predict 1999 prices. Comparing these to the actual 1999 prices enables one 
to determine an approximation of the privatization effect. Overall, privatization is found 
to have raised prices by 5.6 percent over 1994-99, with prices increasing in La Paz/El 
Alto and decreasing relative to trend in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.57 
 
In telecommunications, Figure 4.3 shows that the local cooperatives reacted 
differently, with COTAS, the Santa Cruz telephone cooperative raising both their 
minimum tariff and the price of a public phone call by more than 250 percent between 
1994 and 1999. In contrast, prices fell in La Paz/El Alto, which is not unrelated to 
COTEL, the La Paz cooperative, later falling into financial distress. Averaging across 
cities and weighting for population, one finds an 8.3 percent drop in the minimum tariff, 
whereas the cost of national long distance calls increased 83 percent between 1994 and 
1999. 
 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of Telephone Prices in Bolivia 1992-99
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The mobile market was opened to competition by allowing the entry of ENTEL-Movil in 
1996. From the early 1990’s to October 1996, the incumbent, Telecel, charged a fixed monthly 
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 See Table 19 in Barja, McKenzie and Urquiola (2004) for more details of this extrapolation. 
tariff of $29.9, which did not include free minutes, and a tariff per minute of $0.41 for both 
incoming and outgoing calls.  Additionally, Telecel charged $417 for the initial connection.  An 
aggressive marketing campaign which accompanied the entrance of ENTEL-Movil dramatically 
lowered the cost of cellular services. Under ENTEL’s  “Family Plan” and Telecel’s “Economy 
Plan”, connection fees for digital lines were free, the monthly fixed tariff without free minutes 
dropped to $1.93 in November 1996, and the tariff per minute increased to $ 0.45.  While tariffs 
were previously set in dollars, after competition, they were set in bolivianos, becoming subject to 
depreciation.  Figure 4.4 shows the resulting change in per-minute cellular rates. By December 
1999, the dollar value of the fixed tariff dropped to $1.67 and the per-minute tariff dropped to 
$0.39.  Simultaneously, both ENTEL and Telecel introduced a variety of other plans and 
prepayment mechanisms, with the latter contributing to further penetration. Competition was so 
effective that although the regulator set a price cap of $ 180 for access and $ 51 for use, both 
firms began charging average rates that were roughly five percent of this level. 
 
Figure 4.4
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These reductions, combined with the availability of low cost cellular phones, 
dramatically lowered access prices, particularly compared to the historical performance of the 
local telephone cooperatives, which charge fees in excess of $1,000 for a fixed connection/share.  
As a new operator entered the market at the end of 2000, and as all these markets were 
liberalized in 2001, these trends are expected to continue. 
 
Service Quality 
 
Aside from access and prices, consumers also care about service quality.  Here 
again there are data limitations, but we review the existing evidence for selected sectors.  
For electricity, the 1994 sector law introduced regulation on the quality of distribution,58 
establishing four stages for its implementation.  In a first stage (January 1996 to October 
1997), the distribution firms helped establish the methodology for measurement and 
control of the quality indicators.  In the second, trial period (November 1997 to April 
1998), the distributor tested the methodology, and in the third, transition period 
(November 1997 to April 1998), the firms had to comply with the quality indicators 
established in the rules, subject to monetary penalties.  In the fourth stage (May 2001 on), 
the distribution firms must comply with more demanding levels of the quality indicators 
established in the rules, with similar financial penalties for non-compliance. 
 Table 4.7 presents the admissible limits for the indicators established in these 
rules.  It also covers the results reached by the six firms that are part of the NIS.  The 
indicators are divided into three groups: commercial, technical, and product quality.  The 
data are simple averages from two periods, November 1988 -- April 1999, and May 1999 
-- October 1999.  Unfortunately, these data were not collected pre-privatization.   
 
Table 4.7.  Distribution quality indicators in the transition stage, 1999(1) 
Quality measure Limit allowed CRE ELECTRO-
PAZ 
ELFEC ELFEO CESSA SEPSA
Commercial service quality 
Index of technical complaints 
among users 
10 6.2 2.8 1.1 1.4 3.6 - 
Index of commercial 
complaints among users 
12 2.5 1.7 0.3 1.2 0 - 
Index of billing quality 30 1.8 4.9 1.1 5.1 0.7 - 
Index of estimated billing 25 5.4 16.4 15.6 20 58.5 - 
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 Rules for the Quality of Distribution (1995). 
Eliminado: 21
Average response time -- 
users’ technical complaints 
(hours) 
3 hours 2.7 2.3 3.8 1.4 1.1 - 
Average response time -- 
users’ commercial complaints 
(hours) 
48 hours 35.3 35.7 5.5 0 0.7 - 
Technical service quality 
Average interruption 
frequency per user 
25 y 35(2) 5.9 3.5 3.4 3.2 7.5 4.5 
Total interruption time per 
user (hours) 
20 y 35(2) 6.9 4.2 3.1 3.6 7 3.3 
Technical quality (percentage of cases analyzed by penalty)(3) 
Phase disequilibrium 22.4 3.3 5.3 5.6 - 8.3 
High voltage supply 0 0 25 20.8 - 0 
Medium voltage supply 5.5 6.4 32.5 11.1 61.1 55.9
Centers in medium and low tension 26.1 2.9 30.3 15.5 66.7 70.8
Low tension supply 28.1 6.7 62.3 25 75 56.3
Source:  Memoria 1999, Superintendencia de Electricidad.       
 
 All the distribution enterprises are complying with almost all the commercial and 
technical quality indicators, the exceptions being CESSA for the index of estimated billing, and 
ELFEC for the average time to respond to technical complaints.  Regarding the quality of 
technical production, practically all firms present cases of non-compliance, and in the cases of 
CESSA and SEPSA, these seem rather grave. 
 
 All this information can do is establish that the electricity sector has seen recent efforts to 
improve quality.  We do not know if these levels are better than those one would have observed 
pre-privatization, especially since the firms themselves appear to have helped draft the quality 
guidelines under which they now operate.  For what it is worth, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
distribution problems, particularly blackouts (which may have their ultimate genesis in the 
generation sector), are down since capitalization, and that overall consumers are more satisfied. 
 
 In the case of telecommunications, we omit the specific information for reasons of 
space,59 but nonetheless note that in this sector there were also goals for expansion, quality, and 
modernization, and the degree of fulfillment by operators in long distance, local, and cellular 
services.   
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 Again, this information is available in Barja, McKenzie and Urquiola (2004). 
 In long distance, ENTEL was in full compliance up to 1998.  In local services, the 1998 
goals were achieved by the three largest cooperatives.  In some cases, the goals were fulfilled 
easily, as in the case of the percentage of digitalization achieved by COTAS and COTEL, or the 
percentage of completed calls attained by COTEL and COMTECO.  In others the objectives were 
just met, as in the percentage of calls completed at COTAS.  Only the case of COTEL reveals 
incomplete goals by 1999. 
 
In the case of cellular phone service, in all cases the operators, ENTEL-Movil and 
Telecel, achieved the 1998 expansion and quality goals.  In fact, most of these were 
achieved by 1997, which in part reflects the competitive pressures in this sector.  Indeed, 
available data cannot really account for the fact that substantial welfare improvements 
may have come thanks to the mere existence of new services or substitutes like cellular 
telephony.  To the extent that capitalization facilitated their arrival, one can credit it with 
welfare consequences along this dimension as well. 
 
Valuing the Joint Welfare Impact of Price and Access Changes 
 
We have shown that privatization is associated with increases in access and with a 
mixture of price increases and decreases. As (almost) all consumers do not produce 
water, electricity, or telephone services, Deaton (1989) notes that non-parametric 
estimation of Engel curves will approximate the average welfare changes to consumers 
from price changes.  Ignoring changes in access then, the expenditure shares allocated by 
households to each infrastructure service will allow determination of which consumers 
are most affected by price changes. 
 
 
Examining expenditure shares by household expenditure decile, we find 
electricity to be a necessity, with expenditure shares falling with total expenditure.60 With 
access rates high across all deciles, changes in the electricity price will have the most 
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 Table 23 in Barja, McKenzie and Urquiola (2004) provides a detailed break-down of budget shares by 
expenditure decile. 
impact on the poor. Water expenditure shares fall slightly with expenditure levels, and 
with access to water high, water price changes will also impact the poor most. 
Communications (telephone) is more of a luxury good, especially in 1999. Given access 
to telephones is also higher among richer deciles, price changes for telephone will clearly 
have the most impact on the rich. 
The expenditure share details the impact of a price change on consumers provided 
that they do not adjust the quantity of the service consumed. Banks, Blundell and Lewbel 
(1996) refer to this as the first-order approximation of a welfare change. Let x0 be a 
household's initial total expenditure per capita, wj0 be their initial budget share on service 
j, pj be the price of service j, and U be household's utility. Then the first-order 
approximation of the relative change in utility for a change in the price of service j is: 
 
( ) 0
0
log jj wp
x
U ∆−=∆  .       (1) 
 
Intuitively, a change in the price of a service will have the greatest impact on consumers 
who devote a larger share of their total budget to that service. Of course in practice 
consumers often will adjust the quantity consumed when prices change, and so Banks, 
Blundell and Lewbel (1996) provide a second-order approximation to the change in 
welfare, which does allow some quantity response:  
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The elasticity ∂log wj /∂log pj is estimated by γjj/wj0, where the coefficient γjj is 
obtained from estimation of the Engel equation for household h 
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where nh is the household size for household h, Zh contains other demographic control 
variables, and pi for i≠j is the price of good i. Detailed information on the price of 
substitute goods is not available, and so we do not include other prices in estimating (3). 
 
As presented, equations (1) and (2) would allow estimation of the first and 
second-order approximations of the welfare effects of price changes for households with 
access to the infrastructure service both before and after privatization. In order to value 
the welfare benefit to consumers of gaining access to a service, McKenzie and 
Mookherjee (2003) suggest using the virtual price of the service for those who gain 
access. The virtual price is obtained from the Engel equation (3) as the price at which the 
household would have chosen to consume zero units of the service prior to privatization 
if they had had access to the service in question. The effective price change for a 
household, which gains access, is then the fall from the virtual price to the post-
privatization price. 
 
Two additional complications must be resolved to estimate the value of access. 
The first is that equation (3) is estimated only for households with access, leading to 
inconsistent estimates if omitted variables correlated with access also influence demand. 
A Heckman two-step selection correction is therefore used to estimate (3).  
The second complication is that the Bolivian household surveys are repeated 
cross-sections, rather than a panel. Thus, it is not possible to identify specific households 
who gained access between 1994 and 1999, since the 1999 survey contains different 
households from the 1994 survey. McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) provide a 
methodology for estimating the average change in welfare for a decile, incorporating 
changes in access, with repeated cross-sections. We employ their method here. 
 
Table 4.8 presents probit regressions for access to each of the three services. 
Access is greater in households that are richer, have bigger houses, have more household 
members, are renting, and have less children. These probits can then be used to correct 
for selection in the Engel equation (3).  
 
Table 4.8. Probits for access to infrastructure 1992-99 
  Water Electricity Communications 
  Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient Std. Error   
Head's Age 0.0023 0.0053  -0.0024 0.0076  0.0094 0.0054 * 
Head's Age Squared 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001  
Head is Male -0.2005 0.0321 *** -0.0291 0.0466  -0.0397 0.0309  
Household Size 0.0408 0.0107 *** 0.0690 0.0170 *** 0.0458 0.0102 *** 
Per capita Expenditure Decile 0.1052 0.0049 *** 0.0950 0.0075 *** 0.2107 0.0053 *** 
# rooms in house 0.1549 0.0100 *** 0.2924 0.0188 *** 0.2455 0.0083 *** 
Dummy if rent house 0.3787 0.0292 *** 0.3644 0.0440 *** 0.1395 0.0295 *** 
# in household aged < 15 -0.0740 0.0134 *** -0.1194 0.0210 *** -0.0469 0.0137 *** 
# in household aged > 65 0.0501 0.0437  -0.0728 0.0653  0.0792 0.0383 ** 
Constant -0.0621 0.1145  0.6178 0.1636 *** -3.0524 0.1226 *** 
          
Number of Observations 17581   17581   17581   
Psuedo-R2 0.0964     0.1281     0.2565     
Source: own calculations from EIH waves 5, 6 and 7 (1992, 1993 and 1994) and from ECH 1999.   
 
Table 4.9 presents the results estimating the Engel equation by OLS for households with 
positive expenditure shares, and after the Heckman two-step correction. In the case of 
communications services, there are over 12,000 households with zero expenditure shares 
compared to 2,500 households with positive shares, and the resulting price elasticity under the 
two-step method is positive and insignificantly different from zero. We use the elasticity 
estimated under OLS in this case.  
 
Table 4.9. Engel equations 
Dependent variable: expenditure share of specified infrastructure service 
  Water Electricity Communications 
Variable Coefficient
Std. 
Error   Coefficient
Std. 
Error   Coefficient
Std. 
Error   
OLS Regression Results          
Log price 0.175 0.146  -0.118 0.320  -0.156 0.178  
Log expenditure per 
capita -1.512 0.244 *** -2.749 0.398 *** -1.286 1.061  
(Log expenditure per 
capita)2 0.077 0.021 *** 0.122 0.035 *** 0.092 0.086  
Log household size -0.427 0.041 *** -0.741 0.067 *** -0.491 0.131 
**
* 
Heckman Two-step 
Results          
Log price -0.582 0.260 ** -0.162 0.319  0.289 0.280  
Log expenditure per 
capita -4.726 0.512 *** -0.844 0.408 ** -4.624 1.851 ** 
(Log expenditure per 0.305 0.042 *** -0.013 0.036  0.335 0.146 ** 
capita)2 
Log household size -1.027 0.089 *** -0.527 0.080 *** -1.369 0.245 
**
* 
Lambda -2.016 0.275 *** 3.364 0.025 *** -0.660 0.197 
**
* 
Note: regressions also include dummy for male head, city dummies, and the proportion of the 
household aged 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, and 65 and above.  
 
As described above, the household surveys do not report the specific prices paid 
for each service by individual households, and so we are forced to use aggregate indices 
when estimating the welfare effects in (1) and (2). We have city-specific price indices 
only for the central axis cities of La Paz/El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, and so we 
restrict our analysis to these cities.  
 
For communications, we use the city-specific actual change in the minimum tariff 
between 1994 and 1999 as the change in price for households with access. For electricity, 
we present results under two scenarios: the first uses the actual change in the city-specific 
mean tariff rate between 1994 and 1999, while the second uses only the increase in tariff 
rates relative to that predicted by the trend over 1992-94. For the water concession in La 
Paz/El Alto, we use the change in price relative to the average price in Santa Cruz and 
Cochabamba, while for the second water concession in Cochabamba in 2000 we use the 
average 43 percent price change reported for poorer households. 
 
Table 4.10 presents the estimated overall joint welfare effects of the price and 
access changes for communications and electricity. The estimated value of gaining access 
to telephones is estimated to be 80 percent of per capita monthly expenditure for the 
poorest deciles, and up to 180 percent of per capita monthly expenditure (PCME) for the 
richest deciles. In contrast, the price increases in Santa Cruz and decreases elsewhere had 
a welfare impact of less than two percent of PCME, since budget shares allocated to 
telecommunications are small. The overall impact of price and access changes in 
communications is positive for all but the top decile, for which access did not increase 
enough to offset the price increases in Santa Cruz. Deciles 5-9 benefited the most from 
the expansion of access and price changes, and their average welfare impact was around 
five percent of one month’s per capita expenditure. 
 Table 4.10.  
First and second order approximations to welfare change  
(as a percentage of per capita household expenditure) 
 
COMMUNICATIONS      
       
  Households with Households who     
1994 access both periods gain access Overall mean effect 
Expenditure 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 
Decile approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. 
1 0.59 0.62 53.10 80.64 0.23 0.34 
2 1.81 1.88 20.87 39.55 0.13 0.13 
3 1.73 1.79 56.88 88.25 0.50 0.70 
4 1.35 1.41 54.03 82.77 1.80 2.69 
5 1.79 1.86 57.25 83.17 4.06 5.80 
6 0.77 0.84 85.41 120.17 4.05 5.65 
7 0.47 0.55 99.98 131.57 3.55 4.65 
8 -0.09 -0.02 88.97 124.42 2.62 3.71 
9 -0.40 -0.31 146.99 182.68 8.38 10.51 
10 -0.86 -0.77 142.51 181.82 -7.44 -9.27 
       
ELECTRICITY      
a. Results based on part of price change attributable to privatization 
       
  Households with Households who     
1994 access both periods gain access Overall mean effect 
Expenditure 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 
Decile approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. 
1 -0.50 -0.50 139.04 195.54 12.80 18.19 
2 -0.27 -0.27 102.95 151.32 1.46 2.26 
3 -0.23 -0.23 96.95 144.58 4.19 6.35 
4 -0.21 -0.21 115.29 163.85 2.30 3.36 
5 -0.23 -0.23 88.68 130.94 2.83 4.29 
6 -0.20 -0.20 84.54 128.42 1.75 2.76 
7 -0.18 -0.18 93.21 133.31 1.59 2.34 
8 -0.15 -0.15 83.37 124.34 1.51 2.33 
9 -0.19 -0.18 78.16 113.02 0.71 1.12 
10 -0.15 -0.15 61.51 91.99 0.04 0.13 
       
b. Results assuming all of price change is due to privatization 
       
  Households with Households who     
1994 access both periods gain access Overall mean effect 
Expenditure 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 
Decile approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. 
1 -1.44 -1.43 139.04 195.54 11.97 17.36 
2 -1.02 -1.02 102.95 151.32 0.76 1.56 
3 -0.99 -0.99 96.95 144.58 3.48 5.64 
4 -0.96 -0.95 115.29 163.85 1.60 2.65 
5 -0.99 -0.98 88.68 130.94 2.11 3.57 
6 -1.00 -1.00 84.54 128.42 0.97 1.98 
7 -0.92 -0.92 93.21 133.31 0.86 1.62 
8 -0.89 -0.89 83.37 124.34 0.78 1.60 
9 -0.89 -0.89 78.16 113.02 0.02 0.42 
10 -0.69 -0.68 61.51 91.99 -0.50 -0.41 
 
Recall that average electricity prices increased in all three cities between 1994 and 
1999, which had a negative impact on consumers with access. The price change hurt 
consumers in the poorer deciles more, with an average cost of 1.4 percent of PCME for 
the bottom decile. If one allows that only part of the increase in prices may be a result of 
privatization (scenario 1), then the direct privatization effect on consumers with access is 
at most a welfare loss of 0.5 percent of PCME. Gaining access to electricity is valued 
relatively more by poorer deciles, with the welfare gain from getting access estimated at 
150-200 percent of PCME for the poorest deciles. Increases in access were concentrated 
on the poor, and as a result, the overall impact of privatization is seen to be positive and 
largest for the poorest deciles. These groups experienced an average welfare gain of 17 
percent between 1994-99 from electricity access and price changes, whereas the richest 
decile, for which access was already above 99 percent, experienced an overall welfare 
loss of 0.4 percent of PCME. 
 
Table 4.11 presents separate results for the welfare changes from the water 
concessions in La Paz/El Alto, and in Cochabamba. Two scenarios are presented for the 
concession in La Paz/El Alto: the first assumes that privatization is responsible for all of 
the increase in access which occurred, while the second values only increases in access 
relative to access increases in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba. Gaining access to water is 
valued at 11-25 percent of PCME for the poorest 5 deciles, while the relative price 
decrease has only minor welfare effects. Overall, privatization is seen to have benefited 
the poor most, particularly if one ascribes all of the increases in access to it. 
 
Table 4.11. Welfare changes from water privatizations  
as a percentage of per capita household expenditure 
 
1. Results for La Paz and El Alto only      
Scenario 1: All of increase in access is due to privatization     
Scenario 2: Only increase in access relative to increase in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba  
is due to privatization       
         
  Households with Households who Overall mean effect Overall mean effect
1994 access both periods gain access scenario 1 scenario 2 
Expenditure 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order 
Decile approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. 
1 0.290 0.293 14.48 24.83 4.12 6.93 0.94 1.48 
2 0.218 0.222 5.48 11.48 0.83 1.58 0.31 0.50 
3 0.193 0.196 11.60 17.49 2.01 2.96 0.46 0.63 
4 0.170 0.174 5.08 10.81 1.30 2.63 0.43 0.77 
5 0.181 0.185 8.19 12.82 1.29 1.94 0.87 1.29 
6 0.194 0.198 5.31 9.09 1.15 1.86 0.47 0.70 
7 0.202 0.206 4.52 7.39 0.85 1.29 0.17 0.17 
8 0.196 0.200 6.52 10.12 0.60 0.83 0.18 0.19 
9 0.195 0.199 2.53 4.65 0.42 0.62 0.26 0.33 
10 0.159 0.163 6.18 8.89 0.42 0.54 0.15 0.16 
         
         
2. Results for Cochabamba       
Impact of a 43 percent price change with no changes in access    
as percentage of per capita household expenditure     
         
1999 Mean impact Maximum impact     
Expenditure 1st-order 2nd-order 1st-order 2nd-order     
Decile approx. approx. approx. approx.     
1 -0.99 -0.95 -3.69 -3.65     
2 -1.08 -1.04 -3.52 -3.49     
3 -0.55 -0.52 -2.30 -2.26     
4 -0.69 -0.66 -2.72 -2.68     
5 -0.95 -0.92 -3.04 -3.00     
6 -0.76 -0.72 -1.98 -1.95     
7 -0.75 -0.71 -3.77 -3.73     
8 -0.38 -0.34 -1.03 -0.99     
9 -0.50 -0.46 -1.01 -0.97     
10 -0.57 -0.53 -2.12 -2.08     
 
In contrast, the failed privatization in Cochabamba was a definite welfare loss for 
consumers. Prices increased, and the short-lived nature of the privatization meant that the 
expansions in the water-network agreed upon under the concession contract were not 
realized. Nevertheless, our estimates of the average welfare losses are not nearly as large 
as some press reports suggested.  (For example, Finnegan (2002) reported in The New 
Yorker that “ordinary workers now had water bills that amounted to a quarter of their 
monthly income.” ) 
 
Table 4.11 shows the estimated average cost of a 43 percent price rise is at most 
one percent of PCME. The maximum expenditure share on water observed in 
Cochabamba in the 1999 household survey was 10.5 percent, with an average 
expenditure share of 1.6 percent and the 95th percentile at 5.4 percent. Table 4.11 reports 
the maximum welfare losses in each decile, which is the welfare loss for the households 
with largest water expenditure shares in our sample in each decile. The maximum welfare 
loss of a 43 percent price rise for the households in our sample is 3.8 percent of PCME. 
Although some households experienced larger price increases, most households’ 
expenditure shares were simply too low for even a doubling of price to result in the water 
bill reaching a quarter of income. The numbers reported in the press therefore represent 
the possible maximum impact on a very limited number of consumers, whereas the 
average consumer had much smaller welfare losses.  
 
Poverty and Inequality 
 
The consumer welfare changes estimated here are household level money metric 
measures of the change in welfare if one assumes there are no income effects (Banks, 
Blundell and Lewbel, 1996). McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) therefore suggest that 
these estimated changes can be used to evaluate the impact of privatization on inequality 
and poverty.  
 
The approach is to first calculate the pre-privatization Gini coefficient, Atkinson 
inequality indices, and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) measures of poverty using the 
pre-privatization household per capita expenditures. Counterfactual inequality and 
poverty measures can then be estimated by adding the estimated per capita change in 
consumer welfare to pre-privatization household expenditure, and recalculating the Gini 
coefficient and other measures. Again the use of repeated cross-sections means one is 
unable to identify the specific households, which gained access to the privatized service, 
and so McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) provide a method for calculating the 
counterfactual inequality and poverty measures in this case. 
 
Table 4.12 uses this method to present the overall impact of each of the 
privatizations on inequality and poverty. Privatization of electricity is found to have 
reduced inequality slightly and reduced poverty by 1-1.5 percent. This is mainly a result 
of increases in access to electricity among the poor.  The privatization of telephone 
services is found to have had larger effects, increasing inequality but reducing headcount 
poverty by five to six percent.  
 
Table 4.12. Inequality and poverty effects of privatization 
  Inequality Measures Poverty Measures 
 Gini Atkinson Indices 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
index 
  Index A(0.5) A(1) A(2) a=0 a=1 a=2 
Actual measure in 
1994 (4 main cities) 0.442 0.164 0.278 0.660 0.625 0.259 0.136 
After Telecoms 
Privatization        
first-order 
approximation 0.455 0.171 0.293 0.641 0.572 0.240 0.129 
second-order 
approximation 0.464 0.176 0.303 0.641 0.566 0.240 0.128 
After Electricity 
Privatization        
a. based on price change due to 
privatization       
first-order 
approximation 0.439 0.161 0.275 0.650 0.612 0.250 0.130 
second-order 
approximation 0.442 0.163 0.277 0.648 0.607 0.249 0.130 
b. based on entire 
price change        
first-order 
approximation 0.440 0.162 0.275 0.652 0.615 0.253 0.132 
second-order 
approximation 0.442 0.163 0.278 0.649 0.610 0.251 0.132 
        
Actual measure in 0.434 0.158 0.269 0.633 0.691 0.305 0.168 
La Paz/El Alto in 
1994 
After Water 
Privatization        
a. assuming all of 
access increase due to       
    privatization        
first-order 
approximation 0.427 0.153 0.260 0.626 0.683 0.295 0.160 
second-order 
approximation 0.422 0.150 0.255 0.621 0.677 0.289 0.155 
b. assuming only 
increase in access 
relative        
    to Santa 
Cruz/Cochabamba is 
due to        
    privatization        
first-order 
approximation 0.432 0.156 0.266 0.631 0.691 0.302 0.165 
second-order 
approximation 0.431 0.156 0.265 0.629 0.688 0.299 0.164 
        
Actual measure in 
Cochabamba in 
1999 0.378 0.116 0.210 0.437 0.290 0.086 0.036 
after water 
privatization         
first-order 
approximation 0.378 0.116 0.210 0.437 0.300 0.088 0.037 
second-order 
approximation 0.378 0.116 0.210 0.437 0.300 0.088 0.037 
 
 The explanation for this decrease in poverty occurring along with an increase in 
inequality is that access increased mainly for the middle deciles in Bolivia. This increased 
inequality, but as Bolivia has a very high level of poverty, even households in the fifth 
and sixth deciles lie below the poverty line, and so poverty is reduced when they gain 
access. The distribution sensitive (α=2) Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measure shows 
less of a reduction in poverty as a result. 
 
Inequality and poverty are also seen to have fallen as a result of the successful 
water concession in La Paz and El Alto.  Increases in access to water primarily benefited 
the poor here, while water prices decreased slightly relative to those in non-concession 
cities. In spite of the media attention and widespread protests, the water privatization in 
Cochabamba is not found to have had any impact on inequality, and only an additional 
one percent of households fell below the poverty line as a result. As with the estimated 
welfare effects, the expenditure shares of most households on water were simply too 
small for the price changes in water to have dramatic effects on household poverty levels. 
 
Macroeconomic consequences 
 
 The Bolivian economy has been in recession roughly since 1999.  This began with 
external shocks that hit the export and later the construction sector, and was further aggravated 
by reductions in investment and aggregate demand.  It is key to notice that this macroeconomic 
environment has established two distinct periods in which to analyze the capitalization reforms’ 
performance. 
 
Of course, capitalization in turn had significant impacts on macroeconomic variables, and 
was part of a broader transformation of the economy.  The most visible consequence in this area 
is the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) observed since 1994, which is partly explained 
by the capitalized firms’ activities.  Capitalization-related FDI reached a maximum of 7.5 
percent of GDP by 1998, and total FDI peaked at 11.9 percent in 1999.  This helped raise total 
investment from 14.9 percent of GDP in 1994, to a maximum of 23.2 in 1998.  This investment 
was mainly focused on the energy and infrastructure sectors, which gained importance relative to 
traditional activities like mining.  Moreover, the resilience of FDI to the downturn is an 
important factor in explaining why the recession in Bolivia has by some measures been less 
severe than that in some neighboring countries. 
 
FDI has been greater than domestic private investment since 1995, and of course also 
contributed to total private investment surpassing government investment during 1995-2000.61  
This is important considering the vision of private sector-led growth that has accompanied the 
capitalization process, and the traditionally greater importance of government investment.  
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Additionally, FDI also strengthened the balance of payments accounts and enhanced their 
sustainability. 
 
However, this process ran out of steam with the recession and the end of capitalization-
related investment commitments.  By 2001 total investment dropped to 13.9 percent of GDP with 
a tendency for total government investment to decrease less rapidly then that of the private 
sector, implying a return to foreign debt financing.  Even though FDI has remained fairly strong, 
private domestic investment has fallen quite fast, providing some evidence of capital flight. 
 
Aside from seeking to stimulate investment, the decision to capitalize was considered a 
“second generation” reform, with the usual objective of leaving the private sector in charge of 
productive activities, in an environment of open markets and competition.  The state remained 
responsible for regulating, administering the law, ensuring macroeconomic stability, and 
investing in social sectors; all of these in an environment of decentralization and greater local 
participation. 
 
The composition of government investment gradually came to reflect these priorities.  
Although total investment has decreased as percent of GDP, the social sectors’ participation went 
up from 2.2 percent in 1994 to 3.7 percent in 2001.  Investment in production also increased 
from 0.7 to 1.4 percent of GDP, largely reflecting greater support of the agricultural sector.  
However, investment in the production of extractives decreased from 1.8 percent in 1994 to 
basically 0 percent in 1999, mainly due to withdrawal from hydrocarbons production.  The 
decline in infrastructure from 3.9 to 2.9 percent of GDP partially reflects withdrawal from the 
electricity, telecommunications, and transportation sectors.  Of course, here again one cannot 
exclusively attribute these changes to capitalization, particularly given restrictions to government 
investment imposed by foreign lenders and HIPC obligations. Capitalization also affected the 
revenue side of the state’s finances.  An increase in government income occurred mainly through 
tax collection, with taxes and later royalties on hydrocarbons being its additional post-1996 
component.  In contrast, income from the sales of hydrocarbons decreased substantially from 
1995 on. 
 
 
The net effect of these changes was to lower the fiscal deficit substantially, 
particularly if considered in isolation of the impact of pension reform (which arrived at 
roughly the same time as capitalization).  The deficit was low by 1996, and the 
government even attained a very modest surplus (always without considering pensions) 
in 1999-2000.62  The situation has severely deteriorated with the recession, and including 
pension costs the deficit had reached 9 percent of GDP by 2002.   
 
To summarize, the capitalization reforms were part of a broader restructuring of 
the economy that had multiple indirect effects on households.  One highlight in this 
process is the increased importance of the social components in public expenditure, an 
aspect it seems to have helped bring about.   
 
Political Economy  
 
 We now turn to the political economy aspects of the implementation of capitalization.  
We also venture a few hypotheses on why this reform has proved unpopular, when by several 
technical standards, it would seem relatively successful. 
 
The promise of capitalization  
 
As reviewed above, Bolivia initiated the transition from a state-led to a more 
market-driven economy in 1985.  Initially, this process focused on the liberalization of 
key prices and the promotion of market allocation mechanisms, with the goal of stopping 
hyperinflation and returning to macroeconomic stability. 
 
The Paz Estenssoro administration (1985-89) focused on the achievement and 
defense of stability, strict fiscal discipline, and the onset of structural reforms.  These 
included tax reform and a move towards the independence of monetary authorities.  
These measures had some of the intended result, since GDP growth recovered from 
                                                 
62
 See Figure 11 in Barja, McKenzie, and Urquiola (2004) for more detail on the evolution of the fiscal 
deficit. 
negative numbers in 1985, to 3.8 percent in 1989, with an investment level of 11 percent 
of GDP at the end of this period.   
 
In the next administration (Paz Zamora, 1989-93) the emphasis changed at least in 
principle from stability to growth, always within the general outlines of the economic 
model introduced in 1985.  During this period, the most important initiatives were a new 
Investment Law (to promote domestic and especially foreign investment), the 
Hydrocarbons Law and Mining Code (to attract foreign investment via joint ventures 
with YPFB and COMIBOL) and the Privatization Law.  The latter provided the 
framework to initiate privatizations with small state firms that were generally owned by 
(public) regional development corporations.  For this purpose, the government also 
organized an office devoted to “reordering” state enterprises, establishing their number 
and characteristics in preparation for eventual privatization.  By 1993, growth reached 4.3 
percent, with a 15.7 investment rate. 
 
Still, the consensus was that despite having achieved stability, Bolivia needed 
significantly higher growth to achieve substantial poverty reduction.  In the free market 
setting that had been adopted, this essentially implied the need to further promote foreign 
direct investment and technological change.  It was clear that since stabilization in 1985, 
domestic private investment had advanced slowly.  In the main, domestic firms did not 
seem to have developed the capacity to compete in global markets. 
 
Further, macroeconomic stability itself was repeatedly in question, given that 
various levels of government were still heavily involved in production, and that public 
investment remained the principal engine of growth.  This investment, further, had to 
meet multiple needs such as those in electricity, water, sewerage, telecommunications, 
transportation, and oil exploration – let alone growing priorities in health and education.  
This situation, coupled with pressure from international organizations like the World 
Bank, made it clear that privatization was the path to follow. 
 
The Sanchez de Lozada administration (1993-97) was perhaps the most 
aggressive in structural reform.  Capitalization was only a part of overall changes that 
included greater local participation, and pension reform.  In general, there were two 
emphases: 1) the transfer of productive activities to the private sector, and 2) the sharing 
of social area responsibilities with local jurisdictions.  The first required sector-by-sector 
reform to establish the conditions under which the private sector would participate.  The 
second required reform of the government itself.  While the first was mostly efficiency 
oriented, the second was directed to distributional issues.  This plan responded to a vision 
of economic development in which the private sector would lead investment and growth, 
and the state would regulate markets and increase its efficiency in the provision of public 
and quasi-public goods.   
 
The capitalization mechanism initially promised that a 51 percent share of each 
firm would remain in Bolivian hands.  This would accomplish a double objective:  
democratizing business ownership and stimulating investment and broad-based growth.  
Thus, together with regulation, the promise was one of growth and efficiency under 
private sector leadership, coupled with a sense of social equity embodied in the effort to 
avoid further wealth-concentration.   
 
At the time of implementation, the promise of majority control by Bolivians at large had 
to be abandoned.  Foreign enterprises demanded at least a 50 percent share and control of 
each company, and without this concession it would have been difficult to allay their fear 
of politically-based interference and intervention.  Majority private control, the argument 
went, guaranteed managerial and technological improvements.  In addition, the fact that 
foreign firms’ payments would be invested (rather than go into government coffers), 
would solve long-standing capital constraint problems and promote increases in coverage 
rates, quality, and employment.   
 
This last argument was directed towards reducing the fear that the government, 
awash in “found money” would immediately spend it on social or infrastructure projects 
that, however well-intentioned, would not have a positive, enduring impact on growth 
and responsible financial management (ignoring the possibility that corrupt officials 
might turn these resources to personal ends). 
 
Conflicts during the capitalization process 
 
The approval of the capitalization law in March of 1994 initiated the process.  
This law authorized the executive power to contribute the assets of state firms to the 
creation of Sociedades Anónimas Mixtas (SAM’s) or mixed enterprises.  The Law 
authorized the transfer of portions of these firms to their workers, and to the population at 
large.  Additionally, it allowed the government to sell new, capital increasing shares, in 
international auctions. 
 
The Law’s approval was feasible because the governing party enjoyed a 
congressional majority through a coalition with some smaller parties.63  This majority 
was also key for the approval of all the other relevant laws mentioned above, which 
enabled the executive to then detail their application through extensive decretos 
reglamentarios (detailed regulatory decrees).  The opposition parties64 then and later 
claimed that the laws promoted by the government, including the capitalization law, were 
prepared and approved without regard to any opposition or debate. 
 
A critical issue was the position of organized labor.  Two forces came into play.  
On the one hand, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), the broadest labor organization, 
expressed its opposition to the whole process.  On the other, the government made the 
decision to turn the workers into partial owners, as a way of obtaining their support. 
 
From the start, the COB, which had been much weakened since the 1980’s, 
rejected the idea of capitalization, arguing instead for a strengthening of the state firms’ 
financial and managerial condition.  While it was steady in this position, it was unable to 
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stop direct contacts between the government and the workers and employee unions in the 
firms that were to be capitalized.  While these in turn initially stuck by the COB, one by 
one their respective leaders initiated direct contacts with the government, seeking to 
achieve the best deal for their members. 
Capitalization itself began with ENDE, perhaps in part because its workers were 
not as organized as those in other state firms.  In any event, they were the first to agree to 
partial ownership in exchange for supporting (or at least not actively opposing) the 
process.  ENTEL workers were the second group to fall in line, after negotiating an 
agreement by which benefits as well as job security were guaranteed.  YPFB’s 
capitalization was made viable in a similar way, and the workers obtained a particularly 
important share in Transredes. 
 
In the case of ENFE, the government guaranteed job security for a seven-month 
period, but the workers obtained a relatively small ownership share.  The sale price of 
this firm was well below book value, an outcome that the workers perhaps foresaw.  The 
LAB union posed the strongest opposition to capitalization.  In the event, it also came 
around once guarantees of job security were offered.   
 
 Industry-specific conflict rose particularly in the telecommunications sector, 
where the government aimed at transferring ENTEL (with a period of exclusivity) in the 
long distance market, as well as introducing competition in the local sector.  However, 
the independent cooperatives that provided local phone services strongly opposed giving 
up their monopolies.   Government then asked that they at least transform into fully 
private firms in order to attract private investment and eventually compete in open 
markets.  This was also rejected by the cooperatives. In addition, they continued to 
demand a period of exclusivity in the local service.  The government went along with 
this, but imposed price cap regulation together with expansion and quality goals. 
 
Criticisms of capitalization 
  
Not surprisingly, the capitalization process spawned considerable criticism.  The 
following issues were the focus of much debate: 
1) The notion that the  state enterprises to be capitalized had been run in such a way 
as to benefit only a small group of bureaucrats and politicians – and that even prior to 
capitalization these firms had been a source of corruption and rent-seeking behavior   The 
workers of state enterprises rejected  this idea, arguing that some of the corruption and 
inefficiency previously seen in these firms had been introduced or aggravated by the free 
market reforms the government now wanted to carry even further. 
2) The concept that Bolivians would have a majority stake in the new enterprises, 
one that would never be less than 51 percent.  As noted, government eventually settled 
for the retention of 50% of equity, divided between workers and private pension funds.  
Since management’s 50% of equity was concentrated while the remainder was dispersed, 
management effectively controlled the firms.  Some citizens were upset by this, claiming 
that a promise of domestic control had been broken.   The government objected to this 
characterization, arguing that investors in fact wanted 51 percent, but that thanks to its 
negotiation, they settled for less.  
3) The idea that foreign management would allow technological and managerial skill 
transfer, and that (among other things) this would reduce corruption.  This affirmation 
caused strong reactions among the workers, since state firms (some more than others) had 
historically propelled modernization in different sectors.  Union leaders claimed that 
factors exogenous to the firms, such as the 1980’s debt crisis, accounted for why their 
sources of funding had dried up.  Indeed, it was the lack of investment capital and foreign 
funding that was the key justification for capitalization.  
4) The possibility that state enterprises might be transferred in a hasty “fire sale.”  
Several observers made the point that perhaps the government itself had created the 
conditions for a fire sale, by publicizing the poor state of some of these firms.  People 
suspected that the government would have to absorb substantial debts, and in the case of 
gas and oil, investors would be rewarded with risk-free reserves. 
  
Change of government 
 
The next administration (Banzer-Quiroga, 1997-2000)65 had campaigned on the 
promise to undo the capitalization process.  After taking office it proposed some changes 
in the contracts, and in the functioning of the regulatory system.  This created unease in 
the affected sectors and among potential investors. The issue was put to rest by the World 
Bank’s recommendation that the contracts should not be altered; and the American 
Embassy’s advocacy in favor of the sanctity of contracts of the U.S. firms. 
 
This led the Banzer-Quiroga government to coexist with capitalization. But it was 
a very non-peaceful coexistence, with constant criticisms of the arrangement, with key 
officials expressing that the government firms had been given away for nothing, that their 
transfer limited the government’s income, and reduced expenditure and social 
investment.  Latterly, it was alleged that capitalization was the main cause of the 
recession that started in 1998-99, and accounted as well for the government’s inability to 
spend the country’s way out of it. 
The MNR (the ruling party during capitalization), now in opposition, retorted that 
the capitalization process had not met all expectations in part because it did not have the 
necessary continuity.  It argued that reform was left in the hands of people that did not 
understand or stimulate it. It also made the case that the recession was due to external 
factors, and that in fact it would have been worse had capitalization not taken place.   
 
Nevertheless, the MNR also admitted that the reforms had not been perfect and 
might require some adjustments, particularly the strengthening of laws and regulation.  
For instance, while capitalization/regulation may have made possible the increase in 
natural gas reserves from 5 to 53 TCF, adjustments were necessary to improve the 
government’s share in revenues and to prevent the emergence of vertical monopolies. 
 
Why is capitalization not popular? The collapse of the Sanchez de Lozada 
administration 
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 Hugo Banzer was the President for four years out of the five-year term.  He resigned due to ill health and 
amid significant opposition (dying before the end of this period).  Jorge Quiroga, the vice-president, took 
over for the remaining year. 
As described, the conception and implementation of capitalization involved a fair 
amount of controversy and acrimony, and the constant public carping between 
proponents and opponents can be seen as a major source of the program’s unpopularity.  
In addition, we offer further hypotheses that fall into four general areas:  i) unfulfilled 
expectations, ii) high profile failures, iii) ownership and corporate governance issues, and  
iv) problems induced by associated structural reforms, particularly pension reform. 
 
First, it is possible that capitalization was “oversold” by the administration that 
implemented it, offering excessive claims as to the employment growth it would 
generate, and the financial dividends it would eventually produce for the population at 
large.  Performance on these fronts, while perhaps not bad, has proven disappointing 
compared to the expectations generated.   
 
In the case of employment, for instance, intuition tells us to expect declines in 
employment with privatization, to the extent that (all else equal) state firms typically have 
an inefficiently large number of workers.  Our analysis shows that declines were quite 
modest, especially in the context of the size of the whole labor force.  An economist’s 
conclusion, therefore, might be that employment outcomes were not so bad, especially 
since these firms’ investment focused on capital-intensive non-tradeables.  
 
The general population, however, was told (or it was implied) that capitalization 
would lead to large and rapid improvements both in the quantity and quality of jobs 
available.  In fact, the rate of employment growth during the post-capitalization years 
(even those before the current recession) was not qualitatively different from that 
experienced in previous periods of stability, and the average voter may therefore feel 
disappointed. 
 
Similarly, citizens may have been led to expect that foreign and domestic private 
investment would boom with capitalization.  As discussed above, while investment did 
increase, it then declined significantly with the recession and the end of foreign 
investment commitments under capitalization, to the point that the state’s role in this area 
is showing a tendency toward once again being larger than the private sector’s (especially 
if investment in oil and gas is not considered), with the implied need for greater public in-
debtedness. 
 
Second, a few high profile failures among foreign firms involved in 
capitalization/privatization have increased public suspicions as to the entire process.  This 
was the case of the Brazilian airline VASP, which failed in the administration of LAB.  
VASP departed amidst allegations of asset stripping and accounting fraud.  Additionally, 
there was the case of the Aguas del Tunari consortium, which led to the “water war” 
(described above) and an end to water-related concessions. 
 
A third set of problems concerns corporate governance issues.   Our reading is 
that the population suspects that even if output, productivity, and consumer welfare have 
improved, the capitalized enterprises are being run mainly with the interests of the 
majority (foreign) owners in mind, and that the regulatory system has been unable to 
adequately restrain this natural tendency.  Of course, these problems have been accorded 
further salience by news of the deluge of corporate scandals in the U.S.   
 
This issue has gained particular salience with respect to ownership.  The 
population seems to have expected that through its (roughly 45 percent) share in the 
capitalized enterprises, it would come to share, again rapidly and greatly, in profits flows.  
In the event, the firms have not paid dividends as large as were predicted and these have 
had a direct impact only on the old-age population.  The suspicion, fed by assertions of 
political opponents, is that the firms have found ways to transfer profits to their home 
countries rather than pay then out in Bolivia.  
 
This became a particular headache for the Sanchez de Lozada administration, 
which had at its helm both the President and the party that initially implemented 
capitalization.   This return to power occurred after an acrimonious election in which the 
MNR captured only about 20% of the vote, but by virtue of gaining the first place, was 
nonetheless able to put together a coalition in parliament.  From the beginning, this made 
the administration quite vulnerable.  Like the preceeding Banzer-Quiroga government, it 
was buffeted by periodical waves of protests, particularly from rural unions, including 
those tied to coca-growing regions.   
 
One of the administrations key campaign promises was to return the Bonosol (the 
old-age payment described above) to its initial level of about 240 dollars.  Due to the low 
flow of dividends, however, the Common Capitalization Fund (FCC), which must pay for 
this benefit, simply could not afford it. 
 
As a short-term solution, the government tried to force individuals, through their 
individual retirement accounts (FCI), to buy commitments from the FCC.  There was 
much debate over this arbitrary measure, which in the extreme can be seen as a 
confiscation and forceful redistribution of private property by the very administration that 
in previous times was its staunch defender.   
 
 More generally, the recession and a large budget deficit severely constrained the 
administration’s ability to spend and stimulate the economy.  The deficit was 
substantially related to the pension reform that, as stated above, the original Sanchez de 
Lozada administration had introduced along with Capitalization.   
 
Prior to reform, the Bolivian social security system consisted of a basic pension 
fund and several complementary funds, all of which were of the pay-as-you-go variety.  
Coverage (about 12% of the economically active population) and the worker to retiree 
ratio (3 to 1) were low.  Additionally, there was little financial transparency, investments 
were subject to political interference, and the 80’s hyperinflation had substantially eroded 
reserves.  Management costs, at about 17% of contributions, were high, as were evasion 
and debt.  By 1995 the system was insolvent.  The Secretaria Nacional de Pensiones 
estimated that the government would have to absorb a pension system deficit which 
would reach 0.6% of GDP by 2016, increasing up to 4.3% of GDP by 2060. 
 
In 1996 the Pension Law introduced the individual capitalization fund (ICF) and 
the collective capitalization fund (CCF) system, both administered by private pension 
fund administrators.  The Pension Law also created a transition regime with the following 
characteristics:  (1) the benefits of current pensioners and of those who fulfill 
requirements under the old system are financed by the national treasury, (2) persons who 
have contributed to the old system and do not yet qualify for retirement pass to the new 
system with pension adjustments, (3) agreements with strategic sectors like the military, 
police, judiciary and universities also require financing by the treasury, (4) later, the 
Caracollo and Patacamaya agreements, the result of an episode of social unrest, resulted 
in a substantial increase in the average pension, also requiring financing by the treasury. 
 
By 2002 the new system had almost doubled coverage (which is still low by 
international standards), mobilized savings in an amount above one billion US dollars, 
and introduced greater transparency in the management of the funds. However, the 
transition costs have been substantially higher than expected.  In 2002 the direct financial 
cost of the reform represented five percent of GDP, an amount not expected to decrease 
for an additional decade.    
 
This put the government under substantial fiscal pressure.  The administration 
attempted to raise taxes in February of 2003, but after substantial violence was forced to 
withdraw the initiative.   
 
In the following months, there was also a national discussion on: i) whether 
Bolivia should enter into a sale of natural gas to the U.S., Mexico, and possibly other 
countries, and ii) whether in the event it did, the necessary pipeline should be constructed 
through Peru or through Chile.66  For many in the population, this commercial deal 
seemed to add insult to injury with respect to all the damage that they perceived had been 
done by Capitalization. A first issue was the feeling that Bolivians should be the first to 
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 Bolivia is landlocked, having lost its coastal territories to Chile in the 1879 war.  Because of this fact, a 
substantial proportion of the population was strongly opposed to the pipeline going through Chile, while 
technical studies seemed to suggest that from a commercial point of view that was the optimal outcome.  In 
the end, there was never clear information as to the precise cost differential. 
benefit from the country’s natural resources.  In this case, through the installation of 
domestic natural gas networks, the transformation of vehicles to natural gas, and the 
installation of industrialization plants within Bolivian territory (thereby generating local 
value added).  A second issue was the feeling that petroleum-related rents from 
Capitalization should effectively reach the population through investment in education, 
health and infrastructure.  In both cases, there was a widespread perception that the 
government was representing corporate and political, rather than popular interests.  A 
third, shorter term issue, was the pressure for greater oil and gas rents to help the 
government diminish its fiscal deficit. 
 
In the end, these issues helped catalyze and unify all the opposition to the Sanchez 
de Lozada government, which in October of 2000 began to lose control of the country in 
the face of widespread protests, strikes, and road blockages.  Attempts to reassert 
authority backfired, resulting in dozens of deaths and further opposition, and finally in 
the resignation of Sanchez de Lozada (who was replaced by his Vice-President).  These 
conflicts were of course complicated and multifaceted,67 and it is impossible to say what 
the exact role the opposition to Capitalization, or even the export of natural gas 
controversy, played in the eventual collapse of the government. 
 
In the event, one of the very first actions of the new government was to declare 
that any decision on natural gas exports would be taken only after a referendum.  In 
addition, the government promised a new Asamblea Constituyente (a constitutional 
convention) in order to redefine the Bolivian State in a manner that would make it more 
representative of the people’s interests. Other short run goals include increases on the tax 
burden on private oil sector firms, and a stronger role for YPFB, the original State oil 
company. 
 
A further wrinkle on this issue arises in the case of the gas industry.  On the one 
hand the public is told that Bolivia’s proven and expected reserves have expanded 
enormously since capitalization, and that this will generate great wealth for the country.  
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 Many other issues played into the mix, including land tenure, inter-regional, and ethnic conflicts. 
On the other, they might wonder if and how this wealth will ever reach them.  Those who 
look carefully, for instance, will find that those companies in which the population owns 
shares, mainly Chaco, Andina and Transredes, are arguably no longer the central players 
in this industry, so that the vaunted windfall gains may in fact accrue to firms in which 
they have no stake. 
 
Further, recent developments suggest that the system may evolve in a way that will 
result in further losses in the population’s participation.  At the moment, the population 
can be said to be gaining from relatively high royalties on gas production, and what 
seems to be an ex-post high price for the gas sold to Brazil (this price was previously 
negotiated).  On the other hand, in the 1990 legislation, royalties were equal to 50 percent 
of wellhead value; but in the 1996 law this was reduced to 18 percent for new wells.  
Thus, in the future royalties will fall as “old” wells, those discovered prior to 
privatization, become less important, a process, which is already well underway.   
 
Although in principle these drops are to be compensated by profit taxes and the 
introduction of a so-called surtax, in practice these sources of revenue have not and are 
not expected to fully make up the shortfall.  For that, the country will need substantially 
increased export volumes.   
 
Aside from these issues, there is also a public perception that the capitalized firms 
are very adept at evading taxes.  Recently, for instance, a prominent politician made the 
charge (to our knowledge left uncontested and/or unexplained by the capitalized firms), 
that the Bolivian Catholic University pays more taxes than any of the capitalized oil 
enterprises. 
 
 Further, the gas industry has provided popular opinion with other examples of 
alleged corporate malfeasance in collusion with government officials.  For instance, in 
the negotiations with Brazil, the giant San Alberto and San Antonio fields were classified 
as new (hence paying substantially lower royalties), but YPFB workers insisted these had 
long been discovered.  While the status of these fields was never entirely clarified, 
substantial parts of the public were left with the impression that excessive and costly 
concessions had been made. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Bolivia responded to its 1982-85 recession and instability by initiating a transition 
from a state-led to a market-driven economy.  By 1989, it had liberated key prices in the 
economy, and by 1993 a Privatization Law was in place.  However, the state continued to 
be the main investor in the economy, and remained dependent on foreign debt.  Although 
growth had resumed, it did so at rates that would not significantly reduce poverty levels.   
 
The 1993-97 period was the most aggressive in structural reforms, concentrated in 
two areas: 1) a redefinition of the state-market frontier, as government firms were 
replaced by privatization and regulation, and 2) a redefinition of central-local frontiers 
within the state, as local jurisdictions were given greater funding and responsibilities.  
These two redefinitions implied that the private sector (particularly the foreign one) 
would lead investment and growth, while the state would regulate markets and increase 
its efficiency in the provision of public and quasi-public goods.   
 
Aside from the precise mechanism used to attract foreign investment (mainly 
capitalization), the result was the substitution of government foreign debt with foreign 
direct investment as the engine of growth.  Growth did increase somewhat, and by the 
end of 1998 reached 5.3 percent.  At that point, the country was hit by a series of external 
shocks that began with the Asian crisis and continued with the Brazilian, and later the 
Argentine crises. Though the domestic response to these external events is still a matter 
of debate, the fact is that the economy was pulled into a recession that persists to date.  
By the end of 2002, private investment had fallen substantially, forcing a return to 
government (debt-financed) investment as the main source of growth—this time in an 
environment where its limited resources can only be directed towards the production of 
public and quasi-public goods. 
 
The importance of this bit of history is that any evaluation of capitalization must 
consider it as part of a structural reform aimed at broader objectives.  It also highlights 
the existence of two different periods under which capitalization/regulation had to 
perform.  The first, from 1994 to the end of 1998, is a period of reform implementation 
and initial positive results in an environment of stability and economic growth.  The 
second, from 1999 to present corresponds to a period of reform consolidation in an 
environment of economic recession and increasing political difficulties. 
 
 A complete evaluation of capitalization and privatization is a difficult task, and 
this paper admittedly provides only initial insights into this issue.  At the simplest level, 
the key goal of capitalization seems to have been to attract foreign investment into the 
affected sectors, and the evidence suggests the process met with success on this 
dimension.   
 
In combination with regulation, additional positive outcomes would seem to 
include an increase in access to utilities’ services and significant expansions in proven 
gas reserves – both positive outcomes the benefits of which have not bypassed the poorer 
segments of society.  In fact, we find welfare improvements for households that in some 
cases are greatest in the lower income quintiles.  Additionally, we find evidence of 
productivity increases almost across the board; and most firms have remained moderately 
profitable. 
 
 On the negative side, one observes employment decreases, though these are the 
partial flipside of the productivity increases, and in any case seem to be rather small, 
particularly relative to the economy as a whole.  We also find evidence of price increases 
for some utilities, although except for the case of the Cochabamba water concession, they 
seem to be overwhelmed by increases in access in the welfare calculations. 
 
We want to be clear regarding various caveats to these conclusions.  First, it is 
difficult to disentangle the effects of capitalization/privatization on the one hand, and the 
introduction of regulation, on the other.  Second, it is impossible to fully isolate the 
effects of these processes from those of concurrent events, like the introduction of new 
technologies and enhanced competitive forces.  As stated, another crucial “concurrent 
event” is the economic slowdown that started in 1999, which has introduced substantial 
strains in the performance of the capitalized sector.  In its absence, our assessments of 
these reforms might be rather different.  A third caveat is that many of our results, 
particularly those regarding consumer welfare, refer only to the population in the 
department capitals.  Access and welfare in general remain significantly lower in the rest 
of the country.   
 
Despite these concerns, on balance our assessment suggests these reforms were 
fairly successful.  Popular opinion does not seem to agree with this conclusion.  Here we 
venture that this may be due to the fact that that the government that implemented these 
reforms “oversold” them, promising more, on the job creation front for instance, than 
they could reasonably deliver.  Additionally, the reform’s entire reputation has been hurt 
by a couple of high profile failures, and by a perceived weakness in the regulatory and 
corporate governance frameworks in Bolivia. 
 
 Our speculative impression is that a key lesson from the Bolivian experience is 
that private ownership should be kept as a credible threat and a real option to any other 
firm organization and in any activity.  We think that the existence of the threat allows 
privatization to generate spillovers; for instance, several cooperatives have improved 
their management and become more competitive.  Finally, Bolivian experience reaffirms 
the old adage: in many sectors introducing private participation and market forces is no 
panacea, and the specifics under which privatization is carried out matter a great deal.
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Appendix 4A – Household surveys 
 
For household and individual-level data, including socio-economic 
characterizations, we use three rounds of the Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (EIH) (5th, 
6th and 7th rounds) and the 1999 round of the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) (1st 
round). The EIH was collected in department capitals, and has a sample size of 5,829 
households in 1992, 4,270 households in 1993 and 6,128 households in 1994. Although 
the ECH has national coverage, for comparability we use only the 1,324 households 
which correspond to the same department capitals as the EIH.  
 
These surveys contain the essential access and consumption information. Earlier rounds 
of the EIH contain some information on access and expenditures on utilities, but do not 
contain comparable questions on other expenditure items, meaning that these surveys can 
not be used in the consumer welfare calculations which require expenditure shares.  
As the telecommunications, telephone, and water reforms took place in 1995 and 
1996, the 1994 survey is our “before” observation, and 1999 the “after” one.  We also 
focus on the 1992 survey and use annualized changes over the 1992-1994 period as a 
“control” for annualized changes over the 1994-99 privatization period. This comparison 
is aided because the country had a similar economic performance and relatively stable 
political structure during both periods. The 1993 wave of the EIH is used only in the 
Engel curve regressions: we use it to provide more points of temporal and spatial price 
variation over which to estimate price elasticities. 
 For employment and wage information, we note that the firms in the privatized sectors 
considered here (water, electricity, and telecommunications) are relatively small employers in 
Bolivia, and so the household surveys offer only very small samples of workers in these 
industries. The 1999 survey actually asked respondents to state not only the sector but also the 
precise firm which they worked for.  In the electric sector, we did not find a single respondent 
that declared he or she worked for the electric firms mentioned in the section II.  Rather, many of 
them worked in the “electric” sector, but as electricians or electric appliance vendors.  In light of 
this, administrative information on employment and wage levels was collected from firms and 
regulatory agencies, and provides the basis for our analysis of the labor market effects of the 
privatizations. Additional administrative information on quality-related issues was also collected 
directly. 
 
Appendix 4B – Access definitions and expenditure on utilities 
 
The household surveys ask a variety of questions concerning access to 
different utilities. In all cases we are forced to measure access based on whether 
households actually have the utility in question, rather than if they have the option 
of connecting. In Argentina, Ennis and Pinto (2002) find average take-up rates of 
99.9 percent for electricity and 97.4 percent for water, so determining access 
based on what households are actually using should be a reasonable 
approximation. Based on the household survey questions, we define measures of 
access which are fully consistent across the different surveys listed in Appendix 
4A, unless noted otherwise: 
 
Access to Water: a household is considered to be connected to the water 
network and therefore have access if it declares it has a water connection either 
inside its dwelling or otherwise within the building the dwelling is a part of. 
Households obtaining water from a public faucet, well, delivery truck, river, lake 
or other source are not considered to have access to the water network.   
 
Expenditure on Water: the surveys directly ask total monthly expenditure 
on water from all sources. 
 
Access to Electricity: the 1992 and 1994 EIH surveys ask directly whether 
the dwelling has electricity, while the 1999 ECH asks whether the household uses 
electricity for lighting. A household is therefore defined as having access if it has 
electricity, or uses electricity for lighting. Most users of electricity will use it for 
lighting, and given access rates of almost 100 percent in 1999, we do not believe 
there is much understatement in the 1999 measure compared to the earlier 
measures. 
 
Expenditure on Electricity: the surveys directly ask total monthly 
expenditure on electricity service. 
 
Access to Telephone: the 1994 EIH survey asks directly whether a 
household possesses a telephone, while the 1999 ECH asks whether the household 
has fixed line or cellular telephone service. A household possessing a telephone or 
with telephone service is defined to have access. The 1992 and 1993 EIH surveys 
do not contain a comparable question, and so access to telephones is only 
available for 1994 and 1999. Expenditure on telecommunications is only asked 
separately in the 1999 survey, so instead we use expenditure on communications 
(see below). 
 
Access to and Expenditure on Communications: All surveys ask 
consumers for expenditure on communications, which includes telephone and 
mail expenses. Households reporting positive communications expenditure are 
defined as having access to “communications”, which proxies for access to 
telephone. Although using communications expenditure is likely to overstate 
somewhat access to telephones, the change in access to communications between 
1994 and 1999 has a 0.945 correlation at the decile level with changes in access to 
telephones over the same period. This measure should therefore be a good proxy. 
  
 
 
 
 
